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Trading Places or Changing Spaces? At the Crossroads
of Defining and Redressing Segregation
MELVIN J. KELLEY IV
Segregation rates have remained stagnant in many regions of the United States
since the passage of the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) in 1968 and experts expect
them to increase in large metropolitan areas. Consequently, poor Blacks will be
subjected to the extreme deprivation of group life chances that characterize racially
and economically segregated environments. The global pandemic has only further
exacerbated these dire circumstances. While severe acute respiratory syndrome
coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) may not discriminate, housing, healthcare, criminal,
and economic policies have, rendering impoverished communities of color
particularly vulnerable to the ravages of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19).
The FHA recognizes two theories of discriminatory-effect claims: (1) disparate
impact and (2) segregative effect. The U.S. Supreme Court recently upheld each in
Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project,
Inc., but lower courts have interpreted the majority opinion to erect unprecedented
requirements for plaintiffs seeking to vindicate their fair housing rights. Under
President Biden, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development proposed
new regulations to buttress these discriminatory-effect theories in contrast to the
curtailing rules of the Trump administration.
For over fifty years, fair housing advocates have debated whether remediation
should entail moving racial minorities to affluent, white neighborhoods or enriching
disinvested communities of color. The Court’s ruling left the decision to public officials
and housing providers, but it offered no clear formula for maneuvering around the
prospects of discriminatory-effect liabilities. This Article endeavors to fill in that blank
by exposing the faulty ideological underpinnings and constricted definitions that inhibit
the FHA’s segregative-effect theory from guiding a constructive dialogue on these policy
choices. Specifically, its colorblind framework disconnects race from its operation as a
mechanism for distributing access to vital resources.
Current doctrine solely looks to racial demographics to identify and redress
segregation. As such, the rerouting of resources to majority-minority communities
inherently raises the specter of perpetuating or exacerbating segregation in violation
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of the FHA. This Article contends that a segregative-effect analysis should
co-extensively assess this data set against the region’s geography of opportunity. The
proposed approach comports with the recognition of “lost housing opportunity”
damages in fair housing jurisprudence and reflects insights from Empirical Methods
and Critical Race Theory while offering a formula for redressing the racialized
inequities embedded in both segregation and gentrification.
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Trading Places or Changing Spaces? At the Crossroads
of Defining and Redressing Segregation
MELVIN J. KELLEY IV *
INTRODUCTION
The contemporary proliferation of residential segregation across lines of
race and class is not mere happenstance.1 Indeed, it is one of the many
foreseeable products stemming from the United States’ historically racist
policies and practices coupled with an ongoing failure to fully remediate the
compounding injustices.2 Given this context, it comes as no surprise that
“[n]umerous tangible consequences are associated with the forced separation
of Blacks and [w]hites by place, including . . . . heightened exposure to
environmental hazards, relegation to underresourced schools, increased
contact and surveillance by law enforcement, and even death, hence the term
death by residential segregation.”3 To be sure, the isolation and exploitation
of communities of color have always imparted exposure to heightened
psychological and environmental stressors that operate to reduce life
*
Associate Professor of Law and Business at Northeastern University within the School of Law
and the D’Amore-McKim School of Business. J.D., Columbia Law School; B.A., College of the Holy
Cross. The author thanks Professors Todd Aagaard, Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Olatunde Johnson, Andrew
Lund, Jeremy Paul, and Sarah Schindler for their helpful comments. Additional gratitude is due to
Professor Shelley Cavalieri as well as the other organizers, participants, and facilitators of the American
Association Property Law Section’s New Voices Panel in January 2022. The feedback on this project
through that venue was much appreciated. Finally, special thanks to the editorial staff of the Connecticut
Law Review for their thoughtful and thorough curating. This Article is dedicated to the author’s late
grandmother, Ms. Alma “Gram” Jackson, who was brave enough to depart the U.S. Jim Crow South after
domestic terrorists set her home ablaze to seize the family property. She sought the “warmth of other
suns” so that her progeny might flourish, but the search for a jurisdiction where the light of the stars has
not been obstructed and rerouted through the apparatus of race has, thus far, been an elusive quest.
Nonetheless, the author is ever so grateful for every ray of opportunity Ms. Jackson managed to catch on
his behalf.
1
Lori Latrice Martin & Kenneth J. Varner, Race, Residential Segregation, and the Death of
Democracy: Education and Myth of Postracialism, 25 DEMOCRACY & EDUC. 1, 9 (2017). As used in this
Article, the term “segregation” is best understood as adopting Monica Bell’s four-prong analytical frame
which situates segregation as a function of separation, concentration, subordination, and domination.
Monica C. Bell, Anti-Segregation Policing, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 650, 659 (2020). Under this rubric,
predominantly white communities that have employed exclusionary “social closure” tactics, meaning
methods of subordination to close off opportunities for oppressed groups and achieve or maintain a
monopoly on resources such as power, prestige, education, and material wealth, would not be considered
“segregated.” Erika Wilson, Monopolizing Whiteness, 134 HARV. L. REV. 2382, 2383–91 (2021)
(leveraging social closure theory to unveil oppressive power dynamics in access to education, but still
employing the term segregation to refer to predominantly white school districts).
2
Martin & Varner, supra note 1, at 3.
3
Id. at 1.
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expectancies when compared to their white counterparts. However, this reality
has only been further underscored by the disparate rates of infection and death
impacting the Black community in the wake of the global pandemic.5
According to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, as of
early June 2022, the United States has experienced 84,762,952 cases of the
coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) and 1,004,260 related deaths.6 Data
collection and analysis efforts continue, but many reports have found stark
and alarming racial disparities amid these figures.7 One early assessment
found that Black and Latinx people were three times as likely to be infected
as their white counterparts and nearly twice as likely to die thereafter.8
Employing a measurement of direct and indirect deaths from COVID-19,
more than half of the people who died during the first seven months of the
pandemic were people of color.9 Moreover, vaccination endeavors at state and
local levels also reported troubling disparities, given the respective starting
points for actual need as demonstrated by the number of cases in each
population.10 For example, data from North Carolina indicates that whites
received eighty percent of the vaccines when they only constituted sixty-two
percent of cases, while Blacks and other people of color received twenty
percent of the vaccines although they made up thirty-eight percent of cases.11
More recent reviews suggest that a range of concerted efforts have
narrowed, but have not eliminated, racial disparities as the global pandemic
continues.12 Ultimately, continued vigilance is warranted given the
structural scaffold that undergirds race-based inequities.13 While studies
show that African Americans continue to experience interpersonal and
institutional racism when navigating the healthcare system, residential
segregation itself remains a critical factor in producing these divergent
4

Id. at 9.
Dylan Scott, Housing Segregation Left Black Americans More Vulnerable to Covid-19, VOX
(Ju1y 10, 2020, 4:38 PM), https://www.vox.com/2020/7/10/21319873/covid-19-coronavirus-casesdeaths-black-americans-housing-segregation.
6
Trends in Number of COVID-19 Cases and Deaths in the US Reported to CDC, by State/Territory,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#trends_totalca
ses (in the “View(left axis)” drop-down menu, select “Cumulative Cases”) (last visited June 6, 2022); id.
(in the “View(left axis”) drop-down menu, select “Cumulative Deaths”).
7
Richard A. Oppel et. al., The Fullest Look Yet at the Racial Inequity of Coronavirus, N.Y. TIMES,
(July 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/05/us/coronavirus-latinos-african-americans
-cdc-data.html.
8
Id.
9
Anna Flagg et al., COVID-19’s Toll on People of Color Is Worse Than We Knew, MARSHALL
PROJECT (Aug. 21, 2020, 12:22 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/08/21/covid-19-s-tollon-people-of-color-is-worse-than-we-knew.
10
James H. Johnson Jr. et al, Coronavirus Vaccine Distribution: Moving to a Race Conscious
Approach for a Racially Disparate Problem, 8 J. RACIAL & ETHNIC HEALTH DISPARITIES 799, 800 (2021).
11
Id.
12
Benedict I. Truman, Man-Huei Chang & Ramal Moonesinghe, Provisional COVID-19
Age-Adjusted Death Rates, by Race and Ethnicity - United States, 2020-2021, 71 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 601, 603 (2022).
13
Id. at 605.
5
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trends across racial populations. Residents of segregated neighborhoods
experience poor housing; limited access to medical care; food insecurity;
inferior transportation; reduced employment options; a toxic ecology;
and disproportionate exposure to the criminal justice system. 15 These
interlocking mechanisms power a “dynamic” apparatus that fuels “exposure
to, transmission of,” lack of vaccination against, and death by COVID-19.16
Though a range of approaches for remediating segregation was set forth over
fifty years ago in the infamous Kerner Commission Report,17 the lack of
implementation has left segregation rates from the late 1960s largely intact
with expectations of substantial increases in large metropolitan areas in the
future.18 Absent effective interventions the tolling figure of unjust casualties
will continue to mount.19
In response to over a hundred racial rebellions during the Long Hot
Summer of 1967,20 on February 29, 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson’s
Kerner Commission released a report, urging unprecedented federal
intervention to prevent the United States from becoming “two societies,
one [B]lack, one white—separate and unequal.”21 The report candidly
acknowledged that white society had created, maintained, and otherwise
condoned poverty-stricken communities of color to facilitate the continued
socio-political and economic domination of African Americans.22 After
detailing its findings, the Kerner Commission reviewed potential public
policy responses and concluded there was “only [one] possible choice for
America” to comprehensively redress segregation and the ensuing societal
ills that fueled the uprisings.23 To that end, the drafters recommended
implementing a two-prong approach that coupled “enrichment,” for racially
identifiable regions marred by impoverished conditions, with the
simultaneous development of initiatives that would permit marginalized
populations to move to their preferred neighborhoods without facing
race-based impediments.24

14

Scott, supra note 5.
DREXEL UNIV., URB. HEALTH COLLABORATIVE, COVID-19 IN CONTEXT: RACISM,
SEGREGATION, AND RACIAL INEQUITIES IN PHILADELPHIA 2 (2020).
16
Id.
17
STEPHEN MENENDIAN, RICHARD ROTHSTEIN & NIRALI BERI, THE ROAD NOT TAKEN: HOUSING
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 50 YEARS AFTER THE KERNER COMMISSION REPORT 25 (2020).
18
Douglas S. Massey, The Legacy of the 1968 Fair Housing Act, 30 SOCIO. F. 571, 581–83 (2015).
19
Truman, Chang & Moonesinghe, supra note 12, at 605.
20
1967 saw a total of 164 eruptions of racial resistance, sixty percent of which occurred in July.
OTTO KERNER ET AL., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 66
(1968) [hereinafter KERNER COMMISSION REPORT]. While 1967 marked the peak, such manifestations of
socio-political unrest had been underway since 1963. Id. at 19–21.
21
Id. at 1.
22
Id. at 1, 5.
23
Id. at 10.
24
Id. at 10, 11.
15
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Less than two months later, the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) was
passed on April 11, 1968.25 In the decades since, a seemingly intractable
debate has endured concerning which of the two tactics delineated in
the Kerner Commission’s framework should take precedence under the
FHA, namely, pursuing integration endeavors or furthering community
development.26 Overwhelmingly, fair housing advocates have emphatically
embraced the integration disposition.27 Many have gone one step further
and outright condemned community development tactics as vehicles that
perversely operate to preserve segregated residential patterns.28 To be sure,
the Kerner Commission unequivocally placed a thumb on the scales in favor
of advancing integration by increasing the mobility prospects of people of
color.29 Its policy proposal contemplated the improvement of destitute,
majority-minority areas for pragmatic reasons, as no conceivable program
could instantaneously yield wide-scale integration.30 Yet, the report cautioned
that this should only serve as an interim strategy, and the authors emphasized
that the pursuit of integration was vital because “[t]he primary goal must be a
single society, in which every citizen will be free to live and work according
to his capabilities and desires, not his color.”31
This Article argues that the text of the FHA, in conjunction with its
subsequent interpretation by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) and the federal courts, evinces a deliberate attempt to
allow pertinent parties a measure of leeway in proactively pursuing these
potentially competing stratagems for advancing racial justice.32 This insight
provides a key point of entry for critiquing the current statistical frameworks
that constrain the utility of the segregative-effect theory of liability, which
has long been recognized under the FHA’s prohibition of policies, practices,
25
Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284 § 800, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601–3619).
26
See, e.g., Tim Iglesias, Affordable Housing, Fair Housing and Community Development: Joined
at the Hip, We Need to Learn to Walk Together, 25 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 195,
199–200 (2017) (discussing the “quandary” presented by the FHA, which seeks to both advance
integration and preclude the confinement of people of color in disinvested neighborhoods); EDWARD G.
GOETZ, THE ONE-WAY STREET OF INTEGRATION: FAIR HOUSING AND THE PURSUIT OF RACIAL JUSTICE
IN AMERICAN CITIES 4–7 (2018) (summarizing the conflict between community development advocates
and fair housing advocates as essentially a disagreement over the placement of affordable housing before
delving into the deeper implications of each camp’s position); john a. powell & Stephen Menedian,
Opportunity Communities: Overcoming the Debate Over Mobility Versus Place-Based Strategies, in THE
FIGHT FOR FAIR HOUSING: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF THE 1968 FEDERAL
FAIR HOUSING ACT 207 (Gregory D. Squires ed., 2017) (proposing a synthesized strategy for moving
beyond the unresolved debate about whether to pursue and focus on place-based strategies, mobility
strategies, or some combination of both).
27
GOETZ, supra note 26, at 24.
28
Id. at 147.
29
KERNER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 20, at 10–11.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 11.
32
GOETZ, supra note 26, at 91–92 (discussing how the FHA fails to define “fair housing” and offers
no reference to either “integration” or “segregation”).
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and actions that have the effect of creating, increasing, reinforcing, or
perpetuating segregated housing patterns.33 In addition to outlawing
discrimination on the basis of protected characteristics and requiring HUD
to affirmatively further fair housing through its program, the FHA also
recognized two distinct theories of discriminatory-effect liability: (1)
disparate impact and (2) segregative effect.34 The first theory is implicated
when the allegation entails “harm to a particular group of persons by a
disparate impact,” while the second theory concerns “harm to the
community generally by creating, increasing, reinforcing, or perpetuating
segregated housing patterns.”35
As a general matter, discriminatory-effect causes of action have
primarily been marshalled under the disparate-impact theory. Further, since
no claim has ever been sustained solely on a segregative-effect theory, it is
unclear exactly what the theory adds as a practical matter.36 However, the
landscape is quickly shifting under the Biden administration, which has
sought to mobilize HUD’s rulemaking authority to reinvigorate both
discriminatory-effect theories, in stark contrast to the Trump administration,
which promulgated curtailing regulations.37 This new direction is likely to
prompt revisitation of the segregative-effect theory by fair housing advocates
and courts, but the problem is that current doctrine relies exclusively on local
census data as the source of information that enables substantiation of
a segregative-effect claim.38 This narrow fixation on proportionality and
33
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460,
11,482 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
34
See, e.g., Fair Hous. in Huntington Comm. Inc. v. Town of Huntington, 316 F.3d 357, 366 (2d
Cir. 2003) (citing Leblanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412, 424 (2d Cir. 1995).
35
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg.
at 11,469.
36
Robert G. Schwemm, Segregative-Effect Claims Under the Fair Housing Act, 20 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 709, 735–36 (2017) (reviewing segregative-effect cases and concluding that the
theory has not yet added much to disparate-impact jurisprudence because the only successful
segregative-effect claims have always been accompanied by an allegation of another plausible FHA
violation). However, in some cases, the prospect of a successful segregative-effect claim has been higher
than an associated disparate-impact cause of action. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington
Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1291 (7th Cir. 1977) (perceiving the segregative-effect claim as stronger than
the disparate-impact assertion because the prospective tenants for a subsidized housing development, that
had been denied under zoning regulations, were predominantly white, and yet the inclusion of some racial
minorities still would have constituted a significant step toward integrating the overwhelmingly white
village); Summerchase Ltd. P’ship I v. City of Gonzales, 970 F. Supp. 522, 526–28, 530–31 (M.D. La.
1997) (finding that the defendants were entitled to summary judgement on the plaintiff’s disparate-impact
claim concerning how the revocation of a building permit for low-income housing disproportionately
disadvantaged racial minorities, but allowing the race-based disparate treatment and segregative-effect
claims to advance).
37
Reinstatement of HUD’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 86 Fed. Reg. 33,590, 33,594
(proposed June 25, 2021) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100) (situating the revisitation of HUD’s
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard from 2020 as a response to a
directive from President Biden calling for the federal agency to take all necessary steps to ensure
compliance with the FHA).
38
See, e.g., Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 936 (2d Cir. 1988),
aff’d, 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (admonishing the lower court for failing to uphold a segregative-effect claim
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representation is only conducive to the FHA’s integrative imperative, and it
provides no clear basis for defending community development initiatives.
Indeed, by this benchmark, the decision to pursue community development
would almost always be vulnerable to the contention that the policy
reinforces patterns of residential segregation in urban cities because of the
higher population of people of color therein.
The peril of the current segregative-effect approach is exemplified in
Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, where the New York City
Housing Authority (NYCHA) had completed an urban renewal project but
declined to follow its own tenant screening regulations that would have
given priority to former occupants of the site.39 The NYCHA contended that
the previous residents were largely persons of color and that permitting
them to return would impart a “tipping factor” that would trigger white
flight, resulting in a non-white “pocket ghetto.”40 The Second Circuit
overturned the district court’s determination that the Authority’s conduct
was impermissible.41 Instead, it held that integration did not operate as a
“one-way street” and that the promotion of racial integration could come at
the expense of non-white persons because the ensuing benefits redounded to
the benefit of the community as a whole.42 Thus, the NYCHA was permitted
to defer to the discriminatory preferences of whites and disregard the
interests of racial minorities who were not inherently opposed to living in
communities with a higher proportion of households of color.43 Many fair
when a zoning ordinance precluded a new affordable housing development, whose prospective
tenants were estimated to be twenty-five percent people of color, in a neighborhood that was ninety-eight
percent white).
39
Otero v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1124 (2d Cir. 1973).
40
Id.
41
Id. at 1125.
42
Id.
43
Id. After Otero, the Second Circuit adopted a three-prong test for evaluating the validity of similar
race-conscious integration plans. United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1101–02 (2d Cir.
1988). While limitations were established on frustrating the FHA’s antidiscrimination provisions, the
court did not disturb its underlying conclusion that integration objectives can be furthered to the detriment
of racial minorities. Id. at 1103. Although there has been variance in the governing criteria, other courts
that considered the tension of the FHA’s integration imperative and antidiscrimination mandate have
generally concurred that the former can trump the latter at least under some circumstances. Compare
Jaimes v. Lucas Metro. Hous. Auth., 833 F.2d 1203, 1208 (6th Cir. 1988) (permitting racial quotas to
foster integration until the objective was achieved), with Burney v. Hous. Auth., 551 F. Supp. 746 (W.D.
Pa. 1982) (finding that the housing authority’s tenant selection procedure violated the FHA because a
less discriminatory procedure could eliminate tipping).
Given the foregoing, commentators have also raised concerns about whether residency preferences
could serve as anti-displacement measures in majority-minority communities experiencing the pressures
of gentrification. Zachary C. Freund, Note, Perpetuating Segregation or Turning Discrimination on Its
Head: Affordable Housing Residency Preferences as Anti-Displacement Measures, 118 COLUM. L. REV.
833, 860–61 (2018) (discussing several potential challenges under the FHA, including
discriminatory-effect liability, that residential preferences could be vulnerable to even when they are
designed to benefit oppressed populations). Decisions like Otero could arguably be marshalled to
advance the inverse proposition; namely, that policies can further antidiscrimination at the expense of
integration. Id. at 860. However, this vision of the statute is unlikely to gain traction in the courts at
present, given the prevailing perspective that the FHA is chiefly concerned with upending residential
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housing advocates would readily acquiesce in the integration interpretation
of the FHA and welcome the implications thereof.44 After all, the key
sponsor of the legislation, Senator Walter Mondale, is often cited as stating
that the FHA was designed to replace racially concentrated poverty with
“truly integrated and balanced living patterns.”45 Scholars, activists, and the
judiciary have almost uniformly embraced Senator Mondale’s statement as
the proverbial central command for advancing fair housing interests.46 Despite
a litany of comments to the contrary, the FHA’s text, purpose, and
subsequent interpretation indicate that the “enrichment” of majority-minority
neighborhoods was not to be abandoned for the sake of integration.47
Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court endorsed the viability of
discriminatory-effect claims in Texas Department of Housing and
Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., but cautioned
that “it seems difficult to say as a general matter that a decision to build
low-income housing in a blighted inner-city neighborhood instead of a
suburb is discriminatory, or vice versa.”48 Moreover, the Court expressly
acknowledged that “[i]f the specter of disparate-impact litigation causes
private developers to no longer construct or renovate housing units for
low-income individuals, then the FHA would have undermined its own
purpose . . . .”49 However, the litigation stemmed from a disparate-impact
claim, so the Court’s holding did not take up the question of squaring the
segregative-effect theory and its current emphasis on racial demographic
data with its disinclination to limit the discretion of housing authorities and
developers in “choos[ing] to rejuvenate a city core or to promote new
low-income housing in suburban communities.”50
In keeping with the recognition of a zone for deliberation and in an
attempt to minimize the peril while maximizing the promise of the
segregative-effect theory, this Article argues that the best measure for
patterns of racial or ethnic concentration. Id. at 861. There are also arguments that this integration
approach improperly impedes prospects for meaningful fair housing choice. See W.C. Bunting, In
Defense of a Liberal Choice-Based Approach to Residential Segregation, 88 TENN. L. REV. 335, 338
(2021) (contending that some marginalized groups voluntarily build communities to procure certain
social benefits and, therefore, the government should adopt an ex ante choice-based approach to
residential integration rather than an ex post outcome-based framework that seeks to achieve and
maintain purportedly optimal residential patterns).
44
Iglesias, supra note 26, at 199.
45
114 CONG. REC. 3422 (1968) (statement of Sen. Walter Mondale); Robert G. Schwemm,
Overcoming Structural Barriers to Integrated Housing: A Back-to-the-Future Reflection on the Fair
Housing Act’s “Affirmatively Further” Mandate, 100 KY. L.J. 125, 127 n.18 (2012).
46
See, e.g., Schwemm, supra note 45, at 126–28 (situating integration as a key purpose of the FHA).
47
GOETZ, supra note 26, at 92–96.
48
Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 542 (2015).
49
Id. at 544. For a fuller discussion, see Part I.B–C.
50
Id. at 542. But cf. Stacy Seicshnaydre, Disparate Impact and the Limits of Local Discretion After
Inclusive Communities, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 663, 701 (2017) (contending that the only principled
reading of Inclusive Communities is that Justice Kennedy assumed either policy approach would remedy
racial isolation and therefore, local policy choices must further the FHA’s integration command).
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evaluation of liability under such a claim is to put the harms of segregation
at the forefront of the analysis.51 Segregation was never just about
separation; it operated as a legal regime that was designed to facilitate
subordination and oppression.52 Thus, “[e]ntrenched segregation tends to
deny racial minorities equal access to jobs, government resources, amenities,
. . . [and] quality schools[,]” and “also tends to disproportionately burden
[them] with society’s detritus: power plants and hazardous waste
facilities[,]” as well as incidents of crime.53 Further still, segregation can
adversely impact social capital, and it provides the backdrop for the
implementation of racially stratified policing practices.54 Many integrationists
are likewise privy to these facts and cite them when advancing their
policy prescriptions.55
This Article’s argument for the simultaneous and co-extensive
consideration of census data in conjunction with the local geography of
opportunity to detect and substantiate a segregative-effect claim proceeds in
two parts. Part I provides an overview of the segregative-effect theory and
reviews the current legal landscape for advancing such claims. First, this
Part traces the genesis of discriminatory-effect claims back to their inception
in Title VII jurisprudence and provides a brief synopsis of the first federal
appellate case to hold that impacts, rather than motivations, could also be
grounds for liability under Title VIII.56 Then, it reviews the context for the
promulgation of HUD’s 2013 Discriminatory Effects Regulation, as well the
content thereof. While this regulation was designed to promote uniformity
among the federal circuit courts in the evaluation of discriminatory-effect
allegations, the timing indicates that it also marked an attempt to insulate the
approval of discriminatory-effect causes of action from the scrutiny of the
U.S. Supreme Court under principles of administrative deference. 57
Though the Court ultimately upheld the vitality of discriminatory-effect
theories in 2015, its reasoning was not explicitly grounded in HUD’s 2013
51
I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 44–45 (2009)
(urging renewed focus on the harms of segregation).
52
KERNER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 20, at 3–7 (describing historical underpinnings and
contemporaneous realities of segregated communities); see also Bell, supra note 1, at 659–60 (lamenting
that segregation facilitates isolation and disempowerment, but current “conversations in law and policy
fundamentally misunderstand what segregation entails” such that conservatives equate fair housing laws
with the end of segregation, while liberals can miss racialized power dynamics that might appear neutral).
53
Capers, supra note 51, at 44 (footnotes omitted).
54
Id. at 45.
55
See, e.g., RICHARD H. SANDER, YANA A. KUCHEVA & JONATHAN M. ZASLOFF, MOVING
TOWARD INTEGRATION: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF FAIR HOUSING 338–52 (2018) (marshalling various
case studies to conclude that lower Black/white segregation holds great promise for improving outcomes
for African Americans with respect to employment, income, education, and health).
56
United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974).
57
See, e.g., William F. Fuller, Note, What’s HUD Got to Do with It?: How HUD’s Disparate
Impact Rule May Save the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2047,
2058–62 (2015) (discussing HUD’s disparate-impact rule and the two-step Chevron deference test
established in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
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Regulation, which has spawned a new era of confusion as lower courts
struggle to determine the appropriate test for successful discriminatory-effect
claims.58 While HUD sought to leverage Inclusive Communities as a means of
justifying severe limitations on discriminatory-effect causes of action under
the Trump administration, the winds are now shifting under the Biden
administration to keep HUD’s 2013 Discriminatory Effect Regulation
intact.59 Nonetheless, Part I stresses that the most favorable resolution of the
burdens of production will not yield substantial systemic relief unless racial
demographic data is consulted alongside a region’s geography of opportunity.
Part II substantiates the overarching contention of this Article by
revisiting the historical antecedents of segregation. This backdrop provides
context for evaluating the propriety of the FHA as a vehicle for redressing the
harms of racialized spaces. The legislation that was forthcoming during the
Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s was largely designed to respond to
the problem of racial discrimination as understood under the tenets of
colorblind ideology.60 This framework viewed race as a set of phenotypical
characteristics stemming from a person’s genetic heritage.61 From this
perspective, racism was the irrational and immoral mistreatment of an
individual on the basis of their race.62 In accord, there was a substantial
cohort who surmised that the antidiscrimination mandate embedded in the
FHA was therefore an effective solution to segregation.63 Since people of
color would no long face racial barriers in access to housing, it followed that
balanced demographics across neighborhoods would soon take root.64
After recapping the genesis of segregation and the operation of
colorblindness ideology in fair housing jurisprudence, Part II turns to the
insights from Empirical Methods and Critical Race Theory (e-CRT) to
reveal the problem-solution alignment that taints the current conception of
the segregative-effect theory. E-CRT adherents view race as grounded in
political science and sociology, rather than biology, and accordingly adjust
their empirical methodology.65 Their insights force us to come to terms with
58
Inclusive Cmtys. Project v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 902 (5th Cir. 2019) (discussing
various interpretations of the governing standards for evaluating a disparate-impact claim in the aftermath
of Inclusive Communities).
59
Reinstatement of HUD’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 86 Fed. Reg. 33,590, 33,594
(proposed June 25, 2021) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
60
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT xiv (Kimberlé
Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
61
Id. at xv.
62
Id. at xiv.
63
Id. at xv–xvi.
64
ROY L. BROOKS, INTEGRATION OR SEPARATION? A STRATEGY FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 2–3 (1996).
65
Osagie K. Obasogie, Race and Science: Preconciliation as Reconciliation, in RACIAL
RECONCILIATION AND THE HEALING OF A NATION: BEYOND LAW AND RIGHTS 49, 59 (Charles J.
Ogletree & Austin Sarat eds., 2017) [hereinafter Obasogie, Race and Science] (contending that federal
administrative agencies should employ race impact assessments to ensure delegitimatized notions of
biological race are not used to perpetuate and justify future harms against the descendants of historically
marginalized populations).
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the fact that any relevant data pool for the segregative-effect theory should
provide a window into the corresponding racialized geopolitical inequities.66
In addition to offering the foregoing theoretical and empirical justification
grounded in e-CRT, Part II stresses the necessity of this paradigm shift as it
relates to the practical problems presented by shifting demographic patterns
due to trends in gentrification.67 A number of commentators have lauded the
purported integration benefits flowing from the migration of higher-income,
white households into low-income communities of color because their
presence stimulates much needed amenities and services.68 However, there is
ample reason to believe that such benefits are illusory because rising housing
costs in gentrifying communities have resulted in the displacement of poorer
households of color.69 Moreover, even when they can retain a footing in the
community, other mechanisms operate to enable affluent whites to continue
to exclude poor Blacks from the political and social capital they have
accumulated despite the heightened proximity in living quarters.70
After setting forth the theoretical and practical dimensions of the
problem-solution misalignment, Part II concludes by tracing the evolution
of “lost housing opportunity” damage awards in response to fair housing
violations71 to demonstrate that the proposal herein has already gained some
66

Monica Bell wrote:
For purposes of measurability and convenience, social scientists often calculate racial
separation alone to identify segregation. That reasonable methodological compromise
has evolved, for some, into a conceptual statement about what residential segregation
truly is. Yet, properly understood, racial separation by race is more like a miner’s canary,
warning us that much more sinister mechanisms of racial hierarchy maintenance are
likely lurking.

Bell, supra note 1, at 660.
67
Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Unjust Cities? Gentrification, Integration, and the Fair Housing Act, 53
U. RICH. L. REV. 835, 843 (2019) (“If economic and racial integration are not stable, and if gentrification
instead leads to displacement of lower income residents of color, then gentrification seems in severe
tension with fair housing goals.”).
68
J. Peter Byrne, Two Cheers for Gentrification, 46 HOW. L.J. 405, 405–06 (2003).
69
Compare JASON RICHARDSON, BRUCE MITCHELL & JUAN FRANCO, NAT’L CMTY.
REINVESTMENT COAL., SHIFTING NEIGHBORHOODS: GENTRIFICATION AND CULTURAL DISPLACEMENT
IN AMERICAN CITIES 5 (2019) (“Using U.S. census and economic data, NCRC found that many major
American cities showed signs of gentrification and some racialized displacement between 2000 and 2013.
Gentrification was centered on vibrant downtown business districts, and in about a quarter of the cases it
was accompanied by racialized displacement. Displacement disproportionately impacted [B]lack and
Hispanic residents who were pushed away before they could benefit from increased property values and
opportunities in revitalized neighborhoods.”), with Adam Elliott-Cooper, Phil Hubbard & Loretta Lees,
Moving Beyond Marcuse: Gentrification, Displacement and the Violence of Un-Homing, 44 PROGRESS
IN HUM. GEOGRAPHY 492, 503–04 (2019) (acknowledging that additional data beyond census indicators
is necessary to further substantiate their conclusion that displacement, encapsulating direct displacement
of the poor by wealthy groups as well as the social, economic, and cultural transition which alienates
established populations, is an inevitable consequence of neighborhood gentrification either in in the short
or long-term).
70
Johnson, supra note 67, at 845–46.
71
See, e.g., United States v. Hylton, 944 F. Supp. 2d 176, 197 (D. Conn. 2013), aff’d, 590 F. App’x
13 (2d Cir. 2014) (granting an award of several thousand dollars in lost housing opportunities to compensate
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conceptual traction under Title VIII. A number of administrative and judicial
decisions have found that a person who was unlawfully denied access to the
housing of their choice on the basis of a protected characteristic suffered
“lost housing opportunities” apart from any standard economic injuries and
emotional distress.72 The framework generally applies whenever the person
was attempting to leave their neighborhood for a comparatively advantaged
community, as measured by several factors that impact group life chances,
including the quality of schools, crime rates, and poverty concentration.73
Courts have been increasingly receptive to the recognition of these
neighborhood effects on households and have held that the victims of
disparate treatment should be compensated for such cognizable, adverse
consequences on their prospects for upward mobility and achievement.74
Ultimately, the segregative-effect theory should operate on the same
wavelength and require an analysis of how housing policies and practices
are promoting equal opportunity for impoverished people of color to
accurately identify and target the harms of segregation.75 Here, Professor
john powell’s work in “opportunity map[ping]” is highlighted as a practical
blueprint for connecting the principles of e-CRT to the proposed doctrinal
expansion of lost housing opportunity damages into the segregative-effect
context.76 Moreover, HUD has collected and published data in a mapping
tool that is publicly available, which should aid advocates in undertaking such
comparative analyses of neighborhood conditions.77 Finally, the Article
concludes with a summation of its attempt to align theory and doctrine, so the
debate on integration versus enrichment can at least continue on a field of data
that provides an appropriate point of entry into the controversial dialogue.
a victim of racial discrimination after expert testimony indicated that the defendant’s unlawful conduct
denied the plaintiff access to a city where conditions were conducive to greater upward mobility and
higher achievement).
72
Hylton, 944 F. Supp. 2d at 197.
73
Id. at 186–87; see also Christopher C. Ligatti, Max Weber Meets the Fair Housing Act: “Life
Chances” and the Need for Expanded Lost Housing Opportunity Damages, 6 BELMONT L. REV. 78, 85
(2018) (overviewing sociologist Max Weber’s conception of life chances as the idea that indicators of
socioeconomic status including, inter alia, race, religion and political affiliation would be accompanied
by opportunities for education and employment that would determine an individual’s ability to satisfy
basic physical and mental needs).
74
See, e.g., Hylton, 944 F. Supp. 2d at 197 (basing its decision to award lost housing opportunity
damages partly on the testimony of “an expert in the field of ‘neighborhood effects’”).
75
See Martin & Varner, supra note 1, at 8 (“Equity is the only course of action that can
counterbalance the racist underpinnings of segregation. Equity creates solutions that intentionally engage
differences to remedy past treatment. Any solution forward cannot simply involve walking away from
hundreds of years of oppression based on the simplistic notion of equality. Equity is unapologetic in
working to divert and reinvest financial, emotional, and collective resources, in disproportion, to
counteract what had already been in place.”).
76
Press Release, Othering & Belonging Inst., California Uses Our Opportunity Maps to Build
Affordable Housing in Resource-Rich Regions (Jan. 10, 2019), https://belonging.berkeley.edu/california
-uses-our-opportunity-maps-build-affordable-housing-resource-rich-regions.
77
Restoring Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing Definitions and Certifications, 86 Fed. Reg.
30,779, 30,789 (June 10, 2021) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576, 903).
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I. SITUATING SEGREGATIVE-EFFECT CLAIMS
This Part offers a brief recap of the genesis of the discriminatory-effect
theory under Title VIII by revisiting its origins within the transplant of
developments under Title VII to the housing context. While all federal
appellate courts that have considered the question subsequently agreed that
discriminatory-effect liability was tenable under the FHA, various standards
proliferated until HUD passed a regulation in 2013 that sought to establish
a uniform three-part burden shifting framework for the evaluation of such
causes of action.78 Nonetheless, the timing of this action cannot be
appreciated without an understanding of the concerns that were simmering
regarding the prospects of review by the U.S. Supreme Court, which had
demonstrated hostility to race-conscious remedial measures and appeared
eager to address the standing question of whether the FHA should be read to
greenlight discriminatory-effect claims.
After recapping that series of events, Part I then examines the ensuing
tensions that have hence risen in the wake of the Supreme Court’s adoption
of these theories, albeit with the imposition of constitutional “safeguards,”
which lower courts are now struggling to decipher and implement. The
immediate import of these developments is unknown, so this Part
concludes by identifying and reflecting on likely future directions for the
segregative-effect theory. Notably, it seems likely that segregative-effect
allegations will receive more attention because they have not been explicitly
encumbered by the same judicial standards as disparate impact. Moreover,
HUD is now demonstrating renewed interest in ensuring the salience and
viability of both theories moving forward. Even still, as debates on pleading
and evidentiary burdens carry on, this Article contends that the most liberal
resolution thereof will still render segregative-effect claims ineffectual for
addressing the unequal distribution of group life chances that have been
created and perpetuated by historical and contemporary segregation.
A. The Origin of Discriminatory-Effect Theories Under Title VIII
The genesis of discriminatory-effect claims as a viable vehicle for
advancing civil rights objectives is properly traced back to the U.S. Supreme
Court’s landmark decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,79 which held that
disparate-impact liability was tenable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.80 In Griggs, the employer maintained a policy that required its
78
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460,
11,460, 11,462 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100). Compare, e.g., Huntington Branch,
NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 939 (2d Cir. 1988) (applying three-step burden-shifting
approach), with Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir.
1977) (employing a four-factor balancing test).
79
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
80
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701, 78 Stat. 241, 253 (codified as amended at
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manual laborers to both hold a high school diploma and demonstrate
proficiency on two intelligence tests.81 Initially, the plaintiffs’ allegations
under Title VII included a claim that the policy had been adopted to further
a racially discriminatory purpose, but the Fourth Circuit found that the
assertion had not been substantiated.82 On appeal, the plaintiffs focused on
their contention that the reach of Title VII extended beyond the underlying
motivation animating a practice to its actual effect.83
In resolving this question of first impression, the Court considered both
the text and purpose of Title VII.84 In relevant part, the legislation deemed it
an unlawful practice for an employer to “limit, segregate, or classify his
employees [or applicants for employment] in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”85 An examination of this language
indicated that Congress intended to “proscribe[] not only overt
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in
operation.”86 The statute’s purpose was to further “equality of employment
opportunities” through the removal of barriers that had previously
functioned to favor whites to the detriment of other racial groups.87 In
accord, the recognition of disparate-impact claims was not only appropriate
as a function of its text, but further served to facilitate its overarching goals.88
The logic of Griggs was first transplanted to the FHA by a federal
appellate court in the matter of United States v. City of Black Jack.89 Though
the civil rights era marked a turning point in American history, disputes like
Griggs and Black Jack indicated that the new direction was most assuredly
not welcomed by all.90 While statutes like Titles VII and VIII had outlawed
overt invidious discrimination, the racial ideology as well as the ensuing
plunder for whites it had served to justify were not dismantled.91 In accord,
incentives remained, both then and continuing henceforth to the present, for
maintaining the status quo through the enactment and preservation of
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2).
81
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431–32.
82
Id. at 428–29.
83
Id. at 426.
84
Id. at 431.
85
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
86
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
87
Id. at 429–30.
88
Id. at 429–30, 436.
89
United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974).
90
Rigel C. Oliveri, Setting the Stage for Ferguson: Housing Discrimination and Segregation in St.
Louis, 80 MO. L. REV. 1053, 1062 (2015).
91
Richard Delgado, Two Ways to Think About Race: Reflections on the Id, the Ego, and Other
Reformist Theories of Equal Protection, 89 GEO. L.J. 2279, 2283–84 (2001) (contending that racial
hierarchies are key determinants of access to tangible benefits and that understanding the rationalization
fueling subordination, as well as the prospects for undermining the system and its logics, requires an
assessment of the prevailing economic, international, and labor conditions).
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policies that were designed to ensure white dominance without expressly
naming this objective.92 In Black Jack, this impetus surfaced in an attempt
to wield municipal incorporation as a shield for erecting exclusionary zoning
ordinances that prevented poor people of color from accessing housing in a
predominantly white community.93
The tactic and corresponding polices at issue in Black Jack were far from
anomalous.94 In the aftermath of an explicit statutory ban on race-based
discrimination, the vitality and utility of exclusionary zoning was even more
pronounced as a tool to keep poor people of color out of white areas.95 At
the onset of the era of white flight into suburban communities,96 the nation
experienced a proliferation of zoning ordinances that mandated large lot
sizes for single-family homes and prohibited the construction of
multi-family housing.97 Although facially neutral, the practical effect of the
regulations meant that many disadvantaged minorities were foreclosed from
finding economically viable options in the region.98
Prior to August 6, 1970, Black Jack had been part of a large
unincorporated area in Missouri that was governed by St. Louis County.99
Its population was ninety-nine percent white and the residents thereof were
inclined to keep it that way, but a nonprofit organization known as the Inter
Religious Center for Urban Affairs (ICUA) had other plans.100 Specifically,
the ICUA had proposed a project called Park View Heights that was
designed to “create alternative housing opportunities for persons of low and
moderate income living in the ghetto areas of St. Louis.”101 An application
for federal financial support prompted HUD to issue a “feasibility letter” on
June 5, 1970 which effectively gave a green light for the project as the
agency would set aside enough funding to ensure implementation.102 In
response, residents expeditiously formed the Citizens for the Incorporation
of Black Jack and successfully petitioned the St. Louis County Council for
92
Oliveri, supra note 90, at 1062, 1065; see also Ian F. Haney López, Is the “Post” in Post-Racial
the “Blind” in Colorblind?, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 807, 828 (2011) (“‘White dominance’ invokes a
sociological understanding of group social, economic, and political position. It points toward the reality
of racialized mass incarceration; to disparities in access to adequate housing, schools, and healthcare; to
startling differences in economic security.”).
93
Oliveri, supra note 90, at 1062.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
MARK T. MULDER, SHADES OF WHITE FLIGHT: EVANGELICAL CONGREGATIONS AND URBAN
DEPARTURE 2 (2015) (offering an overview of “white flight” as a process that involved white
homeowners leaving northern cities to take up residence in suburban enclaves after efforts to maintain
residential segregation through intimidation and zoning laws failed to fully restrict African American
mobility in the wake of their northward migration from the South).
97
Oliveri, supra note 90, at 1062, 1065.
98
Id. at 1062.
99
United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1182–83 (8th Cir. 1974).
100
Id.
101
Id. at 1182.
102
Id.

2022]

TRADING SPACES OR CHANGING PLACES

863
103

authorization to be established as an independent municipality. Two
months after incorporation, the newly elected officials of Black Jack
proceeded to pass a zoning ordinance that “prohibited the construction of
any new multifamily dwellings and designated any such current housing
structures as nonconforming uses.”104
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) brought suit arguing that the
policy had not only been adopted for a racially discriminatory purpose, but
was also discriminatory in effect.105 While the evidence indicated that
several members of the community and at least one zoning official were
motivated by racial animus, the district court declined to impute these goals
to the legislation as a whole because the prevailing reported objectives in
preserving property values as well as preventing congestion on the road and
in the schools were well within the bounds of municipal police power.106
The DOJ routed its discriminatory-effect contentions in two packages,
which have hence provided the formulation for disparate-impact and
segregative-effect theories, respectively.107 It charged that the ordinance had
a racially discriminatory effect both in terms of disparate impact and
segregative effect correspondingly “because: (1) more [B]lacks than whites
would be served by Park View Heights, and (2) Park View Heights would
contain a higher percentage of [B]lacks to whites than Black Jack
presently does.”108 Although the court appeared open to recognizing
discriminatory-effect liability as a general matter, it found the proffered
statistical evidence insufficient to sustain these allegations.109
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed both conclusions and, in so doing,
became the first federal appellate court to recognize discriminatory-effect
liability under the FHA.110 The court was not hard pressed to find a violation
of the FHA. Indeed, it found no factual support for Black Jack’s purported
legitimate objectives in passing the zoning ordinance.111 Instead, it was clear
that “at all levels of opposition, race played a significant role, both in the
drive to incorporate and the decision to rezone.”112 Nonetheless, the court
opted to forego a disparate treatment rationale and, instead, buttressed its
holding by recognizing discriminatory-effect liability and finding violations
thereof.113 Its assessment of these claims began by harkening back to
103

Id.
Id. at 1183.
United States v. City of Black Jack, 372 F. Supp. 319, 328–30 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
106
Id. at 328–29.
107
Id. at 329.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 329–30.
110
United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1188 (8th Cir. 1974); see also Schwemm,
supra note 36, at 713–17 (providing an overview of both discriminatory-effect theories and noting a
longstanding history of their recognition by federal appellate courts that began with Black Jack).
111
Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1187–88.
112
Id. at 1185 n.3.
113
Id. at 1184–85 (clarifying that a plaintiff need not demonstrate intent because “[e]ffect and not
104
105
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Griggs. Just as Title VII required the removal of artificial barriers that
operated to effectuate racial discrimination in employment “such barriers
must also give way in the field of housing.”115 In accord, “[t]he plaintiff
need make no showing whatsoever that the action resulting in racial
discrimination in housing was racially motivated.”116
A disparate-impact violation was found because “[t]he ultimate effect of
the ordinance was to foreclose [eighty-five] percent of the [B]lacks living in
the metropolitan area from obtaining housing in Black Jack, and to foreclose
them at a time when [forty] percent of them were living in substandard
or overcrowded units.”117 The segregative-effect ramifications were also
striking as Black Jack’s virtually all white population stood in stark contrast
to the racial demographics of St. Louis which was almost forty-one percent
Black.118 Visually, the court took note that the cumulative impact of Black
Jack’s conduct, alongside other municipalities employing similar tactics in
the region, was fueling an “inexorable process whereby the St. Louis
metropolitan area bec[a]me[] one that ‘has the racial shape of a donut, with
[Blacks] in the hole and with mostly [w]hites occupying the ring.’”119 Given
that the proffered rationales for the policy were found to be untenable, the
city could not justify these undue impacts.120 Though Black Jack marked the
first federal appellate decision to recognize discriminatory-effect claims
under Title VIII, every such court hence that has reviewed the question came
to the same conclusion.121
B. Enter HUD’s 2013 Discriminatory Effects Regulation
Although discriminatory-effect actions have been recognized by the
federal courts since the 1970s,122 HUD only passed a pertinent regulation
governing these theories of liability in 2013.123 While the eleven circuits that
had considered the issue agreed that discriminatory-effect claims were
viable, HUD asserted that the then-new rule was necessary to “formalize
HUD’s long-held interpretation of the availability of ‘discriminatory effects’
liability under the [FHA] and to provide nationwide consistency in the
motivation is the touchstone, in part because clever men may easily conceal their motivations, but more
importantly” because “thoughtfulness can be as disastrous and unfair to private rights and the public
interest, as the perversity of a willful scheme”).
114
Id. at 1184.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 1185 (footnotes omitted).
117
Id. at 1186.
118
Id. at 1183.
119
Id. at 1186.
120
Id. at 1185–87.
121
ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION § 10:7 n.1 (2021)
(collecting cases).
122
Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1185–86.
123
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460,
11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
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124

application of that form of liability.” To be sure, prior to its passage, there
was substantial variance in the methodological tests that proliferated over four
decades of precedent as administrative and judicial tribunals set about the task
of adjudicating matters entailing an allegation of discriminatory effect.125
In order to rectify this state of affairs, HUD’s 2013 Discriminatory
Effects Regulation set forth a standard three-part burden shifting framework
that governs claims employing a disparate-impact or segregative-effect
theory of liability.126 Pursuant to this rule, the plaintiff must first establish a
prima facie case by demonstrating that the challenged practice has, or will
predictably cause, a discriminatory effect.127 Thereafter, the defendant is
afforded an opportunity to contend that the policy or practice is nonetheless
justifiable because it is “necessary to achieve one or more substantial,
legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests.”128 Finally, the plaintiff can still
prevail if they can prove that the asserted objectives could be attained
through other means that would have “a less discriminatory effect.”129 At the
onset, substantiating a prima facie case effectively entails clearing three
subcomponents.130 For disparate impact this means: (1) identifying a specific
policy or practice; (2) verifying a notable disparity in how this policy affects
a protected group compared with others; and (3) proving that this harm is
imparted by the defendant’s policy.131 In a parallel vein, advancing a
segregative-effect theory maps onto these three elements but with some
measure of variance at each stage to reflect its distinct theoretical and
doctrinal foundation.132
With respect to the first prong, unlike disparate impact’s limitation to a
pattern, practice, or policy, segregative-effect theory might further extend its
coverage to isolated decisions by housing providers.133 Second, given the
unique nature of the injury, the relevant data pool is different at step two.134
Instead of comparing the adverse repercussions of a policy on a protected
group as contrasted to others, the focus is on the harm to the
community in general as measured by its impact on residential segregation

124

Id.
Id.
126
Id. at 11,482.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 11,468–69; see also SCHWEMM, supra note 121, § 10:5 (collecting relevant cases).
131
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at
11,482; Robert Schwemm & Calvin Bradford, Proving Disparate Impact in Fair Housing Cases After
Inclusive Communities, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 685, 693 (2016); Schwemm, supra note 36,
at 712–13.
132
See also Schwemm, supra note 36, at 712 (observing that case law and pertinent HUD regulations
call for meeting three requirements in order to make out a prima facie case of segregative effect).
133
Id. at 714.
134
Id. at 713–14.
125
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patterns of protected classes. Finally, there must be a demonstration that
the defendant’s conduct created, increased, reinforced, or perpetuated
segregated housing patterns.136 Here, recent developments have suggested
that the causal nexus could be more remote under a segregative-effect theory
than for a disparate-impact claim.137 Indeed, this is not surprising given that
liability could be predicated on not just creating segregation, but also on
maintaining or otherwise exacerbating such preexisting conditions.138 This
framing suggests a potential affirmative obligation to redress these ills.139
While the foregoing clarifications were welcome, HUD’s pronounced
interest in reducing uncertainty and inconsistency through the adoption of a
uniform rule does not explain the timing of the agency’s actions. To that end,
one must take note of the socio-political and legal landscape that provided
the context for this long overdue intervention. The accounting begins in
2011, when the U.S. Supreme Court, helmed by Chief Justice Roberts,
appeared to take a pronounced interest in examining the propriety of
discriminatory-effect claims under the FHA.140 The manifestation of this
impulse was embedded in its decision to review the matter of Magner v.
Gallagher, which entailed an unsympathetic claim by owners of substandard
housing that the city’s code enforcement endeavors reduced the number of
affordable units available to persons of color in violation of the FHA.141
The prospect of judicial review in Magner prompted heightened
concern among civil rights activists about the continued salience of
discriminatory-effect theories because the Court, just four years prior, had
evinced unequivocal hostility to race-conscious remedial measures by
striking down voluntary school desegregation efforts as unconstitutional in
Parents Involved.142 Shortly thereafter, HUD, operating under the Obama
administration, initiated the process for developing a discriminatory-effect
regulation by issuing a proposal and opening a period for public

135
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at
11,469; see also Schwemm, supra note 36, at 713–14 (explaining that statistical evidence is paramount
in proving both discriminatory-effect theories but that the focus is different because segregative-effect
claims must consider how a challenged action affects residential segregation rather than its impacts on a
protected class, which is the domain of disparate impact).
136
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at
11,469; SCHWEMM, supra note 121, § 10:5 n.3 (collecting relevant cases).
137
Schwemm, supra note 36, at 757.
138
See infra Part I.D.
139
Seicshnaydre, supra note 50, at 690–91 (“Justice Kennedy’s opinion does not privilege local
government policy discretion over fair housing objectives. It merely gives local governments room to
maneuver . . . . Thus, the discretion does not center on whether local governments may work to overcome
segregation, but how.”).
140
Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 831 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011),
cert. dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012).
141
Id. at 830, 833.
142
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 747–48 (2007)
(plurality opinion) (discussed infra Part II.B).
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comments thereof. There is no doubt that the hope was to insulate
discriminatory-effect theories by situating their recognition as a function of
administrative interpretation, promulgated in accord with a delegation of power
from Congress, which would require some measure of judicial deference.144
As HUD’s rulemaking process was unfolding, Magner moved to a
settlement, but another opportunity arose shortly thereafter for the Court to
reach the question of discriminatory effects in Township of Mount Holly v.
Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc.145 It was during this window,
between the petition for certiorari and the subsequent grant by the U.S.
Supreme Court,146 that HUD finalized its disparate-impact rule.147
Nonetheless, this time around, high certainty permeated that the Court was
poised to make an adverse ruling on the fate of disparate impact because it
had just come off the heels of its 2013 decision in Shelby County v. Holder,
which invalidated the continued application of a key provision in the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 that was designed to combat racial discrimination in
voting.148 While the petition in Mt. Holly sought to challenge a municipal
revitalization plan because it unduly raised costs and disproportionately
displaced racial minorities, the claim could have been construed as impeding
local government initiatives designed to redress blighted neighborhood
conditions.149 Yet again, members of the fair housing community were able
to breathe a sigh of relief when the case settled just three weeks prior to its
scheduled oral argument.150
Ultimately, the third time proved to be the proverbial charm as the Court
finally addressed the viability of discriminatory-effect claims under the FHA

143
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 76 Fed. Reg. 70921
(proposed Nov. 16, 2011) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
144
As the agency primarily responsible for administering the FHA, HUD’s regulations interpreting
the FHA have been deemed entitled to substantial deference. See 42 U.S.C. § 3608(a); Meyer v. Holley,
537 U.S. 280, 287–88 (2003); see also Fuller, supra note 57, at 2059–60 (arguing that HUD’s
disparate-impact rule should be entitled to deference under the two-part test announced in Chevron,
which provides that a reviewing court will uphold an agency’s interpretation of a statute that it is charged
with administering as long as: (1) the governing legislation is silent or ambiguous on the specific question
at issue and (2) the agency’s interpretation is a reasonable construction of the law’s provisions).
145
Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 375 (3d Cir. 2011),
cert. granted, 570 U.S. 904 (2013), cert. dismissed, 571 U.S. 1020 (2013).
146
Id.; Stacy Seicshnaydre, Will Disparate Impact Survive?, CONST. DAILY (Nov. 21, 2013),
https://web.archive.org/web/20190615133246/https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/will-disparate-impactsurvive.
147
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460
(Feb. 15, 2013).
148
Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013); see also Jamelle Bouie, The Next Assault on
Civil Rights, SLATE (Oct. 9, 2014, 10:53 AM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2014/10/the-supremecourts-next-attack-on-civil-rights-the-justices-will-likely-end-the-fair-housing-acts-disparate-impact-rule.h
tml (arguing that the Roberts Court has been hostile toward both voting rights as well as affirmative action
and appears poised to target fair housing next).
149
Seicshnaydre, supra note 146.
150
Id.
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in Inclusive Communities. The matter entailed the Texas Department of
Housing and Community Affairs’ administration of the Low-Income
Housing Tax Credit Program (LIHTC), which subsidizes the acquisition,
construction, and rehabilitation of affordable rental housing.152 The federally
funded initiative requires state agencies, or their designees, to develop and
implement a set of selection criteria for distributing the credits among
prospective housing developer applicants.153 The Inclusive Communities
Project, a nonprofit that aims to promote racially and economically diverse
communities through the expansion of affordable housing opportunities,
brought suit alleging that the operation of the program violated the FHA under
disparate-impact theory because it encouraged LIHTC projects to be
concentrated in predominantly Black neighborhoods in Dallas and away from
white suburban areas.154 To the surprise of many, the Court ruled that the
disparate-impact theory of liability was indeed cognizable under the FHA.155
C. Supreme Court Endorsement? Unpacking the Enigma of Inclusive
Communities
Despite the holding in Inclusive Communities, the Court undertook its
analysis of the FHA without affording any noted measure of deference to
HUD’s 2013 Discriminatory Effects Regulation.156 Instead, the majority
opinion, authored by Justice Kennedy, relied primarily on a comparison
between the text of the FHA and other federal statutes advancing civil rights
objectives in employment and education respectively, which had previously
been interpreted by the Court as authorizing disparate-impact liability.157 In
addition to these parallels in statutory language, Justice Kennedy found that
this expansive reading was appropriate in light of the FHA’s role in the
nation’s ongoing struggle against racial segregation.158 While many lauded
the plaintiff’s victory as advancing civil rights in access to housing, other
commentators recognized that any purported celebration was perhaps
151

Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2513 (2015).
Id.; see also NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL. & PUB. & AFFORDABLE HOUS. RSCH. CORP.,
BALANCING PRIORITIES: PRESERVATION & NEIGHBORHOOD OPPORTUNITY IN THE LOW-INCOME
HOUSING TAX CREDIT PROGRAM BEYOND YEAR 30 6–8 (2018), https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/Bal
ancing-Priorities.pdf (providing an overview of the LIHTC program).
153
Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2513.
154
Id. at 2514.
155
Scott M. Badami, “Disparate Impact” Claims Survive Fair Housing Act Challenge, FOX
ROTHSCHILD LLP: FAIR HOUS. DEF. (June 26, 2015), https://fairhousing.foxrothschild.com/2015/06/art
icles/discrimination/disparate-impact-claims-survive-fair-housing-act-challenge/.
156
Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2516–17.
157
Id. at 2516–19 (situating previous interpretations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 as instructive guideposts for how to read the
FHA, but also marshalling Bd. of Ed. of City Sch. Dist. v. Harris, 100 S. Ct. 363 (1979), which upheld
disparate-impact liability for all discriminatory practices outlawed under the Emergency School Aid Act
after examining the legislation’s text, history, purpose and structure).
158
Id. at 2525–26.
152
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premature because the language in the decision gave pause in predicting the
actual impact of the holding moving forward.159
Before the matter came before the U.S. Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit
had not only verified the salience of discriminatory-effect liability, but
outright adopted HUD’s 2013 Discriminatory Effects Regulation as the
governing guidepost in evaluating such causes of action under the FHA.160
Though this opinion was technically affirmed, Justice Kennedy did not
expressly acquiesce in HUD’s interpretation and raised several cautionary
tales concerning the reach of disparate-impact claims in the future.161
Notably, in revisiting Griggs, Justice Kennedy made it clear that
disparate-impact liability under both Title VII and Title VIII would only
mandate the “‘removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers,’ not
the displacement of valid governmental policies.”162 Further still, “adequate
safe guards at the prima facie stage” were deemed essential to minimize undue
exposure to defendants and avoid the constitutional questions that would
proliferate if housing providers were effectively forced to constantly consider
race so as to avoid a lawsuit.163 From this vantage point, Justice Kennedy
observed a plaintiff would have to prove “robust causality” by demonstrating
a statistical disparity was actually caused by the defendant’s policy.164
While some suggested the variation in semantics employed by the Court
as contrasted with the language in HUD’s Regulation were slight and
potentially negligible,165 the district court on remand understood Inclusive
Communities to have erected “a materially different (and more onerous)
prima facie case burden of proof.”166 It proceeded to find that the plaintiffs
had failed to point to a specific policy rather than the overall application
decision making process for LIHTC housing and thus, could not meet the
159
See Lauren Clatch, Inclusive Communities and the Question of Impact: Pro-Plaintiff?, MINN.
L. REV. DE NOVO (Dec. 8, 2016), https://minnesotalawreview.org/2016/12/08/inclusive-communitiesand-the-question-of-impact (cautioning that the decision was not unambiguously pro-plaintiff and,
therefore, an assessment of its impact would have to wait until results manifested in subsequent
district court decisions). Compare, e.g., Elizabeth L. McKeen, Bimal Patel & Ashley Pavel, Robust
Causality and Cautionary Standards: Why the Inclusive Communities Decision, Despite Upholding
Disparate-Impact Liability, Establishes New Protections for Defendants—Part I, 132 BANKING L.J. 553,
557 (2015) (arguing that the holding adds nothing for plaintiffs while adding protections to defendants),
with Dennis Parker, Why Today Was a Battle Won in the War Against Racial Discrimination, ACLU
(June 25, 2015, 2:15 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/racial-justice/why-today-was-battle-won-war-agai
nst-racial-discrimination (describing the opinion as not throwing any “additional boulders” in the path
toward equality).
160
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs., 747 F.3d 275, 282 (5th
Cir. 2014).
161
Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2522–26.
162
Id. at 2522.
163
Id. at 2523.
164
Id.
165
Robert G. Schwemm, Fair Housing Litigation After Inclusive Communities: What’s New and
What’s Not, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 106, 121 (2015).
166
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs., No. 3:08-CV-0546-D, 2016
WL 4494322, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2016).
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“robust” causality requirement for a prima facie burden. As a result, the
matter was outright dismissed.168 In the vacuum of a definitive statement on
the relationship between the apparent limitations erected in Inclusive
Communities and HUD’s 2013 Regulation, the lower courts have once again
splintered in their approaches to evaluating disparate-impact claims.169
A survey at the federal appellate level reveals varying interpretations and
implementations of Justice Kennedy’s opinion. In MHANY Management, Inc.
v. County of Nassau, the Second Circuit held that HUD’s 2013 regulation was
entitled to deference and that the Supreme Court had implicitly adopted the
agency’s standard in Inclusive Communities.170 The Fifth Circuit recently
found the conclusion reached in Mhany Management Inc. untenable.171 In
Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Property Company, the Fifth
Circuit determined that the plaintiffs were unable to reach the “robust
causa[lity]” test set forth in Inclusive Communities.172 In explicating this
conclusion, the court noted that, unlike the Second Circuit, it read Inclusive
Communities as “undoubtedly announc[ing] a more demanding test than that
set forth in the HUD Regulation.”173 The Fourth Circuit’s approach, also
referenced by the Fifth Circuit in Lincoln Property, effectively sidesteps a
detailing of any notable difference between Inclusive Communities and
HUD’s 2013 Discriminatory Effects Regulation.174 Specifically, in Reyes v.
Waples Mobile Home Park Limited Partnership, the Fourth Circuit made it
clear that Inclusive Communities would control its inquiry to the extent that
there were any material deviations from the HUD regulation—though none
were expressly noted—while simultaneously maintaining that the agency’s
standard was nonetheless entitled to deference.175
Most circuit courts, like the Fourth and Fifth, have adopted the language
of “robust causality” as conveyed in Inclusive Communities, but here again
167

Id. at *6–8.
Id. at *13.
169
See Claire Williams, Note, Inclusive Communities and Robust Causality: The Constant Struggle
to Balance Access to the Courts with Protection for Defendants, 102 MINN. L. REV. 969, 989–90 (2017)
(“The language in Inclusive Communities is not clear about when the robust causality standard should be
employed, at summary judgment phase or earlier at the pleading stage, which conflicts with the nature
of the two different stages of litigation.”). Compare, e.g., Inclusive Cmtys, 2016 WL 4494322, at *1
(describing the new burden as “more onerous”), and Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, No. 14-cv-3045, 2016
WL 1222227, at *5 (D. Minn. Mar. 28, 2016) (applying robust causality standard at the pleading stage),
with Winfield v. City of New York, No. 15CV5236, 2016 WL 6208564, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2016)
(reasoning that the guidance from Inclusive Communities on establishing a prima facie case for
disparate-impact liability did not alter the standard at the stage of pleading such that a plaintiff need only
produce allegations that give rise to the pertinent inference rather than proffer statistical evidence).
170
MHANY Mgmt., Inc. v. Cnty. of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 618–20 (2d Cir. 2016) (upholding
determination that plaintiffs had established prima facie case of discriminatory effects in challenging a
municipality’s refusal to accommodate requests for rezoning a parcel to permit multifamily housing).
171
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 902 (5th Cir. 2019).
172
Id. at 906.
173
Id. at 902.
174
Reyes v. Waples Mobile Home Park Ltd. P’ship, 903 F.3d 415, 424 n.4 (4th Cir. 2018).
175
Id. at 432 n.10.
168
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its import has been the subject of different treatments. In Reyes, the
majority opinion suggested that any instance where a housing policy or
practice has been found to adversely impact a protected class more than
others could potentially support a finding of robust causation.177 In contrast,
the dissenting opinion would not have found that robust causation was
established because the defendants were not responsible for the underlying
demographics of the relevant community, and as such, the expansion of an
immigration status screening policy from the leaseholder to all adult
occupants had not “caused” a disparate impact on persons of Latinx
ancestry.178 The Eleventh Circuit seemed to operate in a parallel vein to the
logic of the Reyes dissent in Oviedo Town Center II, L.L.L.P. v. City of
Oviedo.179 There, the court stressed the Supreme Court’s injection of “robust
causality” as a means of “ensuring that racial imbalance does not, without
more, establish a prima facie case of disparate impact.”180 In Ellis v. City of
Minneapolis, the Eighth Circuit also found that Inclusive Communities
provided new guidance and required plaintiffs to “point to an ‘artificial,
arbitrary, and unnecessary’ policy causing the problematic disparity” as a
prerequisite for establishing a prima facie case.181
In Lincoln Property, the Fifth Circuit adopted strands from all of the
foregoing approaches in dismissing a disparate-impact claim against private
property owners who refused to participate in the Housing Choice Voucher
(HCV) program when their rental units were in a majority white area.182
First, it read the majority opinion in Reyes for the narrow proposition that
there it was the defendant’s change in the governing policy and subsequent
enforcement thereof that was responsible for the disparate impact.183 This
treatment resolved the tension between the majority and dissenting opinions
because the finding was no longer contingent on the purported “geographical
happenstance” concerning the relevant racial demographics of residents in
the community.184 In accord, the rationale of the Eleventh Circuit also found
176
Lincoln Prop., 920 F.3d at 903–05 (reviewing different standards on “robust causation” in
sister circuits).
177
Id. at 906.
178
Reyes, 903 F.3d at 434–35 (Keenan, J., dissenting).
179
759 F. App’x 828 (11th Cir. 2018).
180
Id. at 834–35 (finding that a city-wide comparative analysis was necessary before owners of a
majority-minority affordable housing complex could potentially establish a prima facie case of disparate
impact from a municipal utility rate increase).
181
Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, 860 F.3d 1106, 1113–14 (8th Cir. 2017) (holding that for-profit,
low-income housing providers’ allegations that city inspections disparately impacted racial minorities
amounted to a disagreement over the extent of deficiencies under reasonable housing-code provisions).
182
Lincoln Prop., 920 F.3d at 895, 909. The HCV program, commonly known as Section 8, is
funded by HUD, but administered by state and local housing authorities. Thereunder, rental subsidies are
paid to landlords on behalf of admitted low-income households. However, landlord participation is
voluntary unless state or local law provides otherwise. Id. at 900.
183
Lincoln Prop., 920 F.3d at 906.
184
Id.
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a foothold and permitted the Fifth Circuit to reason that the housing
providers could not be held responsible for the geographic distribution of
racial minorities in the region or for the overrepresentation of African
Americans as voucher holders.185 Finally, its opinion also gave a nod to the
proposition advanced by the Eighth Circuit in Ellis.186 Specifically, it noted
that a private entity’s decision to opt out of a voluntary government program
could not be deemed “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary” without
sufficient factual allegations to the contrary.187 The Fifth Circuit
subsequently declined to modify or reverse the standard announced in
Lincoln Property in the matter of Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v.
Heartland Community Association.188 Over dissenting opinions and other
objections, lower courts in the Fifth Circuit have hence followed suit. Notably,
the court in Treece v. Perrier Condominium Owners Association, Inc.
commented that, “[a]pparently, the Fifth Circuit has taken the Supreme Court
at its word that it did not intend for it to be easy to establish robust causation
in an FHA case and did not intend to hold a defendant liable for a disparity it
did not create.”189
D. Enduring Questions for Segregative-Effect Claims amid Evolving HUD
Regulations and Contrasting Case Law
Yet another wrinkle exists in terms of trying get a bead on the legal
landscape governing discriminatory-effect theories under the FHA. Inclusive
Communities only dealt with the question of disparate-impact liability so its
significance, if any, for segregative-effect claims is still uncertain.190 To the
extent that the “robust causality” language has been understood to mount a
heightened standard of review for disparate-impact liability, this development
would not necessarily map onto the segregative-effect theory.191 Nonetheless,
it certainly raises the specter of unresolved questions.192 Two glimpses into
the uncertain future have been offered at this juncture.
First, in Lincoln Property, the Fifth Circuit not only addressed the
sustainability of a disparate-impact cause of action, but also had the occasion
185

Id. at 907.
Id.
187
Id.
188
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Heartland Cmty. Ass’n, 824 F. App’x 210, 217–18 (5th Cir. 2020).
189
Treece v. Perrier Condo. Owners Ass’n, 519 F. Supp. 3d 342, 359 (E.D. La. 2021).
190
Schwemm, supra note36, at 714 (“The Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Inclusive Communities
endorsed FHA disparate-impact claims, but did not deal with—indeed, barely mentioned—the
segregative-effect theory.”).
191
Id. at 757–78 (“[T]o date, the cases have only demanded that a segregative-effect plaintiff show
that the defendant blocked an integrated housing proposal in a white area or fostered such a proposal in
a minority area.”).
192
Recent Case, Fair Housing Act – Segregative-Effect Claims – Fifth Circuit Dismisses
Segregative-Effect Claim Against Private Actors. – Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Lincoln
Property Co., 920 F.3d 890 (5th Cir. 2019), reh’g en banc denied, 930 F.3d 660 (5th Cir. 2019), 133
HARV. L. REV. 1476, 1476 (2020) [hereinafter HLR, Fifth Circuit Dismisses Segregative-Effect Claim].
186
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to consider the plaintiff’s claim that the defendants’ refusal to accept
vouchers in white areas perpetuated racial segregation.193 In anchoring its
assessment, the court turned to Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of
Huntington, a seminal discriminatory-effect case out of the Second Circuit,
which found that a local government’s zoning policies had perpetuated
segregation through its restrictions on sites deemed suitable for private
multifamily housing construction.194 Nonetheless, in light of its engagement
with Inclusive Communities, the Fifth Circuit found that the Supreme
Court’s cautionary tales still had import in this setting.195 However,
somewhat surprisingly, this impulse manifested in distinguishing Huntington
Branch on the grounds that it dealt with a public entity.196 Here, the potential for
placing affirmative obligations on private landlords was deemed to run afoul of
the safeguards announced in Inclusive Communities for ensuring that “valid
governmental and private priorities” were not displaced.197
On this front, the outcome in Lincoln Property has been properly
critiqued for lacking a foundation either in the statute’s language or in
precedent because no such public-private distinction was drawn in Inclusive
Communities.198 Others have argued that a more appropriate translation of
the perceived limitations established in Inclusive Communities to
segregative-effect theories would have been better served by repacking
“robust causality” as mounting a new “significantly perpetuat[ing]
segregation” threshold.199 In this way, the opinion could have more faithfully
paid homage to the underlying concerns about cabining the reach of
discriminatory-effect theories in triggering liability due to observed racial
imbalances that cannot be adequately traced to the defendant’s policy.200
Though no threshold has ever been established for triggering
segregative-effect liability, this approach would have also had the benefit of
reflecting a set of similar concerns evinced in a handful of prior cases that
were seeking “significant” impacts before finding a violation of the FHA.201
193
Inclusive Cmtys. Project v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 908 (5th Cir. 2019). Plaintiffs also
alleged disparate treatment on the basis of race, but the assertions were dismissed as “vague and
conclusory.” Id. at 911.
194
Id. at 908.
195
Id. at 908–09.
196
Id. at 908.
197
Id. at 908–09 (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 2507, 2524 (2015)).
198
HLR, Fifth Circuit Dismisses Segregative-Effect Claim, supra note 192, at 1480.
199
Id. at 1481 & n.64.
200
Id. at 1481–83.
201
See Davis v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 166 F.3d 432, 438 (2d Cir. 1999) (“The proper standard to be
applied on remand is whether the proposed use of the working family preference will significantly
perpetuate segregation at the relevant NYCHA developments.”); Ave. 6E Invs., LLC v. City of Yuma,
No. 2:09-cv-00297 JWS, 2013 WL 2455928, at *7 (D. Ariz. June 5, 2013), rev’d on other grounds, 818
F.3d 493 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 295 (2016) (rejecting a segregative-effect claim because
the racial impact of the blocked development, which was proposed near an integrated area, was not
“significant enough” to reduce segregation there).
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In sharp contrast, Judge Davis concurred in part and dissented in part
from the majority opinion in Lincoln Property.202 With respect to the
segregative-effect claim, he eschewed any such public-private distinction
and stuck by the operative language animating the theory, which outlaws
actions that create, increase, reinforce, or perpetuate segregation.203 As such,
Judge Davis argued that to prevail in this cause of action a plaintiff need
only demonstrate pre-existing patterns of segregation and that the challenged
conduct will perpetuate that segregation, not that it was the root cause
thereof.204 Although the application for rehearing en banc was denied by a
vote of nine to seven, the latter camp of judges who dissented from the denial
not only praised Judge Davis’ dissents in Lincoln Property, but forcefully
echoed the conclusion that liability is proper when a defendant’s actions
perpetuate or further existing segregation.205
A second peek at the hazy horizon is offered by HUD’s current
campaign to undo the attempted dismantling of the 2013 Discriminatory
Effects Standard during the Trump administration. Under the guise of
comporting with Inclusive Communities, former U.S. Secretary of HUD,
Ben Carson, promulgated a new regulation in 2020 that radically altered the
standards for advancing and defending a disparate-impact cause of action
under the FHA.206 This new regulation passed but never took effect because
it was successfully challenged in the matter of Massachusetts Fair Housing
Center.207 Plaintiffs argued, among other contentions, that the 2020 rule
violated the Administrative Procedure Act, which requires federal agencies
to engage in “reasoned decision-making” and enables courts to set aside
agency actions that are “arbitrary or capricious.”208 The court found that the
plaintiffs demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success and issued a
preliminary injunction on enforcement of the 2020 rule thereby leaving the
2013 regulation intact.209

202
Lincoln Prop., 920 F.3d at 913 (Davis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Specifically,
he concurred in the dismissal of additional claims that were raised in the litigation pertaining to disparate
treatment and unlawful advertising but dissented from the dismissal of both discriminatory-effect claims.
Id. at 912–13.
203
Id. at 922 (criticizing the majority for imputing a flawed vision of “robust causality” to the
segregative-effect claim, which was a distinct cause of action targeting the perpetuation of segregation).
204
Id. at 922–24 (contending that the majority’s approach to causality would be tantamount to
requiring the plaintiffs in Griggs to show that their employer’s policy caused African Americans to not
have high school diplomas and would render discriminatory-effect liability a dead letter under the FHA).
205
Inclusive Cmtys. Project v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 930 F.3d 660, 661, 666 (5th Cir. 2019) (Haynes,
J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
206
HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 85 Fed. Reg.
60,288 (Sept. 24, 2020) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
207
Mass. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 496 F. Supp. 3d 600, 611–12 (D.
Mass. 2020).
208
Id. at 609–10.
209
Id. at 611.
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Notably, the court held that HUD was not merely incorporating the
results of Inclusive Communities, and that its claim to clarify the governing
standards was untenable given the inclusion of new terms, an altered
burden-shifting framework, and new defenses.210 HUD is following suit with
the decision and is now seeking to reinstate the previous regulation, but the
contrast in content between HUD’s 2013 and 2020 regulations provides
another window into the enduring judicial debate about the reach of
discriminatory-effect liability.211 Per HUD’s 2013 Regulation, a prima facie
case is established by the plaintiff after identifying a practice that has caused
or will predictably cause a discriminatory effect.212 By contrast, HUD’s 2020
regulation erects an explicit expansion of this initial step into a requirement
for clearing five distinct hurdles at the pleading stage.213
Specifically, a plaintiff would have to allege sufficient facts and
ultimately prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) “the
challenged policy . . . is arbitrary, artificial, and unnecessary”; (2) there is a
“robust causal link” between the policy and its alleged effects; (3) the
purported impact adversely affects members of a protected class; (4) any
such disparity is “significant;” and (5) there is a direct link between the
disparate impact and the ensuing injuries.214 Advocates have been rightly
concerned that the new rule would, at minimum, make it far more difficult
for members of the protected classes to vindicate their rights when they are
disproportionately subjected to adverse ramifications stemming from
discriminatory housing policies in both the private and public sectors.215
Especially noteworthy, on its face, the defendant is now alleviated of its
burden to produce a legitimate justification for its policy if it does produce
a demonstrable disparate impact.216 Instead, pursuant to the first element, the
plaintiff must now prove at the onset that there is no possible “valid interest
or legitimate objective” that could be furthered by the defendant’s practices.217
Previously, a defendant would have been required to rebut a prima facie case
210

Id. at 610–11.
Id.
212
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460,
11,469 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
213
HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 85 Fed. Reg.
60,288, 60,332 (Sept. 24, 2020) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
214
Id.
215
See, e.g., Press Release, Nat’l Low Income Hous. Coal., Preliminary Summary of Proposed
Disparate Impact Rule 1 (Aug. 1, 2019), https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/NLIHC-PreliminarySummary-of-Proposed-Disparate-Impact-Rule.pdf (summarizing the key features in the proposed
changes that collectively evinced a concerted effort by the Trump administration to “make it much more
difficult, if not impossible, for communities of color to challenge discriminatory effects in housing”).
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Olatunde Johnson & Michelle Aronowitz, The Trump Administration’s Assault on Fair Housing,
COMMON DREAMS (Aug. 24, 2019), https://www.commondreams.org/views/2019/08/24/trumpadministrations-assault-fair-housing.
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HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 85 Fed. Reg. at
60,332.
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by claiming such a legitimate interest was animating its conduct, and the
failure to do so would have permitted the plaintiff to prevail.218
In addition to this enhanced protection for defendants, the new rule offers
two unprecedented defenses to disparate-impact causes of action.219 First, the
defendant could escape liability by asserting that its policy was mandated by
federal, state, or local law, or required per a court order or administrative
decree.220 Yet another escape hatch is offered to a defendant using risk
assessment tools that disproportionately affect protected classes if the
prediction is accurate, which can be shown by demonstrating that the
overarching standard is not unnecessarily restrictive as reflected in the
outcomes of similarly situated protected and nonprotected persons.221 Clearly,
the reverberations here would be particularly liberatory for housing financial
services including mortgage banking and homeowner’s insurance.222 Scholars
and activists have noted that “[b]etween the unusually stringent and likely
never to be satisfied prima facie case, and the two all-encompassing and easy
to satisfy defenses, the proposed rule appears to use a belt and suspenders
approach geared to ensure no effects case slips through.”223
HUD’s 2020 rule was also distinctly retitled “Implementation of the Fair
Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard”224 and, in accord, removed the
pre-existing operative language authorizing discriminatory-effect liability
for policies and practices that “create[], increase[], reinforce[], or
perpetuate[]” segregation.225 This change did not go unnoticed, prompting
activists to raise concerns that HUD may have been attempting to remove
this theory from the purview of fair housing jurisprudence altogether.226
HUD’s official explanation in responding to such comments is that the
“removal of this phrase was part of HUD’s streamlining of the regulation
and . . . generally, HUD views ‘perpetuation of segregation’ as a possible

218
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460,
11,482 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
219
HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 85 Fed. Reg. at
60,332–33.
220
Id. at 60,333.
221
Id.
222
Johnson & Aronowitz, supra note 216.
223
Id.
224
HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 85 Fed. Reg.
60,288 (Sept. 24, 2020) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
225
24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a) (2014); see also HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s
Disparate Impact Standard, 85 Fed. Reg. at 60,306 (acknowledging that HUD had removed language
regarding segregation from the definition of discriminatory effects but denying that the semantic
adjustment substantively modified any obligations under the FHA).
226
See Stephen Menendian, Disparate Impact Liability Is the Best Remedy for Structural Racism,
U.C., BERKELEY: BERKELEY BLOG (Oct. 22, 2019), https://blogs.berkeley.edu/2019/10/22/disparateimpact-liability-is-the-best-remedy-for-structural-racism (contending the proposed new rule’s
elimination of language that defines discriminatory effects to encompass the perpetuation of segregation
frustrates the integration goals of the FHA).

2022]

TRADING SPACES OR CHANGING PLACES

877

harmful result of unlawful behavior under the disparate-impact standard.”227
Most assuredly, the assertion flies in the face of over four decades of
precedent, which has firmly cemented the segregative-effect theory as its
own distinct vehicle for demonstrating a violation of the FHA.228
Nonetheless, it was prudent of HUD to candidly acknowledge the
continued prospects of a segregation claim even as it sought to undermine
discriminatory-effect liability. While Inclusive Communities only mentioned
this theory in passing, when it did, its commentary evinced general
approval.229 For example, Justice Kennedy’s opinion noted that the FHA
seeks “to ensure that those priorities can be achieved without arbitrarily
creating discriminatory effects or perpetuating segregation.”230 Moreover, in
situating its interpretation of the statutory language, the majority opinion
considered it instructive that, through an amendment to the FHA in
1988, Congress effectively ratified several circuit decisions authorizing
discriminatory-effect liability including Black Jack, Arlington Heights, and
Huntington Branch.231 These landmark decisions embraced not only
disparate impact, but segregative-effect claims, as well.232
Further still, HUD’s 2013 Discriminatory Effects Regulation sought to
establish a uniform standard for both theories and, while it was not outright
adopted, neither was it greeted with hostility.233 To the contrary, the Court
appeared to cite it with some measure of approval.234 Indeed, this treatment
is precisely what has led the Second Circuit to conclude that the regulation
was implicitly embraced in Inclusive Communities.235 Finally, Justice
Kennedy’s opinion ended by stating: “The Court acknowledges the Fair
Housing Act’s continuing role in moving the Nation toward a more
integrated society.”236 As noted, under President Biden, HUD is mobilizing
liberal interpretations of Inclusive Communities to launch a call for

227

HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 85 Fed. Reg. at

60,306.
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Schwemm, supra note 36, at 710.
See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507,
2519–22 (2015).
230
Id. at 2522.
231
Id. at 2519–20.
232
See, e.g., Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 937–38 (2d Cir.
1988); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. Of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1288 (7th Cir. 1977);
United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1186 (8th Cir. 1974).
233
See Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2522–23 (citing HUD’s 2013 Discriminatory Effects
Regulation with approval for providing a framework that affords defendants an opportunity to state and
explain the valid interests served by their policies as a mechanism to ensure appropriate limitations on
disparate-impact liability while permitting housing authorities and private developers a measure of
discretion in formulating initiatives).
234
See id. (agreeing with HUD’s interpretation of the FHA and the agency’s corresponding
guidance as set forth in provisions of the 2013 Discriminatory Effects Regulation).
235
MHANY Mgmt., Inc. v. County of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 618 (2d Cir. 2016).
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Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2525–26.
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reinstating HUD’s 2013 Discriminatory Effects Regulation altogether.237
Nonetheless, even if this outcome is achieved, it is possible that additional
decisions in the vein of Lincoln Property will be forthcoming as other courts
steadfastly consider how to translate the perceived “safeguards” announced
in Inclusive Communities to the evaluation of a segregative-effect cause of
action. After all, the current split in the lower courts stems from a divergence
in interpreting the Supreme Court as acquiescing in the authority of HUD’s
2013 regulation or abrogating its legitimacy.238 Those marching to the beat
of the latter drum will be unlikely to yield in the wake a regulatory shift
headed by the Biden administration.
E. Exposing the Intrinsic Limitation of Both Conservative and Liberal
Approaches
Although the particulars of the ultimate standards for weighing the
success of a segregative-effect claim will have notable import in individual
cases, this Article suggests that no approach thereunder can adequately
rectify the oppressive conditions imparted by policies and practices that
create, increase, reinforce, or perpetuate segregation. While the hurdles
continue to shift and evolve, at bottom, the landscape for vindicating a
segregative-effect claim has and will continue to center on the review of
local census data in isolation to ascertain how regional racial demographics
are impacted by a policy, practice, or decision.239
Though HUD’s 2013 Discriminatory Effects Standard attempted to
promulgate a standard three-part burden-shifting framework for the evaluation
of a segregative-effect claim, it declined to offer much guidance on the
parameters concerning the contours of the statistical evidence that would lead
to successful vindication.240 Given that the demonstration of a violation was a
“fact-specific inquiry” coupled with the expansive reach of the FHA across
the private and public spheres, HUD thought it would be “impossible to
specify in the rule the showing that would be required to demonstrate a
discriminatory effect in each of these contexts.”241 In the absence of additional
regulatory insights, consulting the results in prior cases is instructive. Recall
that advancing this cause of action effectively requires: (1) identification of a
237
Reinstatement of HUD’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 86 Fed. Reg. 33,590, 33,590
(proposed June 25, 2021) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
238
See Treece v. Perrier Condo. Owners Ass’n, 519 F. Supp. 3d 342, 352–33 (E.D. La. 2021)
(explaining that the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that debate existed on whether the Supreme Court
adopted or modified HUD’s 2013 Discriminatory Effects Regulation, but nonetheless concluded that
Inclusive Communities announced a more demanding test).
239
See Schwemm, supra note 36, at 738 (“While a variety of data sources may be used in
disparate-impact cases, the segregative-effect precedents suggest a fairly straightforward approach that
relies almost exclusively on local census data.”).
240
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460,
11,460, 11,468 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
241
Id. at 11,468.
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policy, practice or decision; (2) verification that a community is experiencing
segregation; and (3) demonstration that the challenged action has created,
increased, reinforced, or perpetuated said segregated conditions (or is
otherwise likely to do so).242 A review of the most salient cases indicates that
courts generally rely on local census data as a vehicle for concluding whether
or not a community should be deemed racially segregated.243
Generally, neighborhoods that had populations that were over ninety
percent white warranted the conclusion that the area was segregated.244 In
contrast, courts were inclined to reject the assertion of segregation whenever
the racial demographics in the local community were more or less reflective
of respective group representations at the larger metropolitan level.245
Illustrating the nexus between segregation and the defendant’s policy has
similarly entailed a fairly straightforward assessment based on census
data.246 If the policy or practice at issue is blocking or restricting an
affordable housing development, courts have been inclined to assume that the
likely demographics would be reflective of the income-eligible population in
the metropolitan area.247 As such, predominantly white communities that
impede economical housing opportunities in racially diverse metropolitan
regions present the circumstances that are likely to satisfy a court in its efforts
to ensure that the requisite causal nexus is present.248
To the extent that we can anticipate continued efforts to migrate the
“safeguards” of Inclusive Communities to the segregative-effect theory, the
reverberations of “robust causality” may very well mean heightened
standards for a segregative-effect cause of action.249 At this juncture, despite
glimmers of an alternative direction as articulated by the dissent of Judge
Davis in Lincoln Property and those who stood in solidarity, the most likely
candidate for this transplantation is a “significant[]” standard before liability
is triggered under a segregative-effect theory.250 First, the issue was already
242

Schwemm, supra note 36, at 756–58.
See, e.g., Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. Of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1286–87, 1291
n.9 (7th Cir. 1977) (finding “overwhelming” segregation when census data revealed that the Village’s
population was ninety-nine percent white in a metropolitan area that otherwise had a substantial presence
of African Americans).
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See Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 929, 931, 937 (2d Cir.
1988), aff’d, 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (describing the Town as ninety-five percent white and the relevant
community as ninety-eight percent white).
245
Ave. 6E Invs., LLC v. City of Yuma, No. 2:09-cv-00297 JWS, 2013 WL 2455928, at *7 (D.
Ariz. June 5, 2013) (rejecting a segregative-effect claim because the Latinx community had already been
integrating into the region over the past two decades such that the white population had fallen from
seventy-five percent in 1990 to somewhere between forty-eight and sixty-five percent as of 2010 and,
therefore, the modest additional integrative impact of the housing proposal was insufficient to support a
finding of a violation).
246
United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1183, 1183–86 (8th Cir. 1974).
247
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flagged by some courts before Inclusive Communities. Second, it seems
to be a far more accurate reflection of the Court’s recently expressed
concerns about reining in the reach of discriminatory-effect liability than the
proposed resolution proffered by Lincoln Property, wherein the Fifth Circuit
drew a rather unprecedented distinction between public and private actors
under the FHA.252 Finally, this formulation would also parallel the standards
announced in HUD’s 2020 Disparate Impact Standard, which specifically
requires the plaintiff to assert that the identified disparity is “significant” in
order to establish a prima facie case.253
If the foregoing development transpires, the result may be that plaintiffs
will have to rely on more sophisticated methodologies to identify segregated
neighborhoods and illustrate the import of the defendant’s action in imparting,
maintaining, or exacerbating those conditions.254 However, the playing field
will not be dramatically altered from its current fixation on engaging with the
phenomenon of racial segregation through the sole prism of demographic data.
Unfortunately, no matter how low or high the evidentiary burden, this tool will
remain utterly and wholly incapable of redressing segregation because it
adopts a fundamentally flawed definition of the problem and correspondingly
points to an ineffectual remedy while improperly curtailing the discretion of
housing developers and public officials.
II. A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF RACIAL SEGREGATION
This Part endeavors to unpack the unstated ideological perspective that
currently animates the contours of the segregative-effect theory and fair
housing advocacy more broadly. Our understanding of the genesis and
persistence of racial segregation, as well as its ensuing harms, will necessarily
direct the content of our proposed tactics for effective remediation. While no
statutory definition has ever been forthcoming,255 a 2015 HUD regulation in
conjunction with judicial evaluation of segregative-effect claims reveals a
consensus that “segregation” is present whenever the racial demographics of
a particular community are disproportionately skewed as considered against
the backdrop of the broader metropolitan area.256 Given the nation’s history,
one would be hard pressed to deny the salience of injecting the presence of
251
See, e.g., In re Malone, 592 F. Supp. 1135, 1147, 1152, 1167 (E.D. Mo. 1984) (finding that the
potential introduction of ten to fifteen Black persons into an all-white population of 2,400 could not
sustain a segregative-effect claim because the impact of the project “on segregated housing patterns is
insignificant and such a de minimus [sic] impact is not sufficient to establish a prima facie violation of
the Fair Housing Act”), aff’d, 794 F.2d 680 (table) (8th Cir. 1986).
252
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 907–08 (5th Cir. 2019).
253
HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 85 Fed. Reg.
60,288, 60,332 (Sept. 24, 2020) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
254
Schwemm, supra note 36, at 739.
255
GOETZ, supra note 26, at 92.
256
See, e.g., United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1183 (8th Cir. 1974) (discussed
supra Part I.A).

2022]

TRADING SPACES OR CHANGING PLACES

881

racial concentrations into a formula that would provide a window into
segregation.257 However, without more, the approach offers a tool that is
ill-suited for the task at hand.
In this Part, the Article contends that the truncated landscape governing
the segregative-effect theory is an enduring remnant of the colorblindness
ideology that dominated the discourse on the appropriate bounds of
antidiscrimination doctrine during the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s.258
While the concept of an ideology has been interrogated under an array of
multidisciplinary perspectives that have spawned competing interpretations
thereof, the term “ideology,” as used herein, generally refers to: “the broad
mental and moral frameworks, or ‘grids,’ that social groups use to make sense
of the world, to decide what is right and wrong, true or false, important or
unimportant.”259 The precepts of colorblindness provided several “frames” or
“dominant themes” for filtering through the debates on the best policy
proposals for redressing racial injustices through civil rights legislation. 260
Most critically, colorblindness posited that “race” is merely a set of
phenotypical characteristics, including skin color and hair texture, that were
the products of one’s genetic heritage.261 From this perch, racism was
understood to be the irrational, arbitrary, and immoral mistreatment of
individuals based on these innate characteristics.262 On the one hand,
conservatives contended that such conduct was rare and pushed for intent
requirements in the law.263 On the other hand, liberals thought it was more
widespread and pushed for discriminatory-effect liability, so neutral rules
that disproportionality impact racial minorities could be challenged
whenever the policy or practice was unjustifiable.264
Critical race scholarship grew out of a deep dissatisfaction with the
restrictions imposed by the terrain of the debate.265 Instead of acquiescing in
the mainstream discourse, these scholars argued for a definition of race that
retained its socio-political, cultural, historical, economic, and psychological
dimensions.266 Today, colorblindness has evolved into post-racialism and
diversity ideology, but the underlying frameworks are mere upgrades that
257
Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1377 (1988) (describing the
interwoven and interlocking oppression of spatial separation and material subordination that African
Americans were subjected to during Jim Crow).
258
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in Color-Blind, “Post-Racial” America, 59 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1358, 1368–69 (2015).
259
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similarly fail to capture an accurate portrait of race. This Part explains
why such truncated visions must be abandoned in favor of the lens employed
by critical race theorists if the segregative-effect theory is to have any
salience as a tool for advancing racial equality, whether through integration
or enrichment.
A. The Root and Branches of Housing Segregation
In Inclusive Communities, Justice Kennedy posited that the FHA was
paramount “in our Nation’s continuing struggle against racial isolation [and
in] in striving to achieve our ‘historic commitment to creating an integrated
society.’”268 These sentiments are widely shared among the scholars,
attorneys, and activists who comprise the community of mainstream fair
housing advocates. At bottom, integration has been situated as the solution
to segregation.269 Evaluation of any remedial tactic first requires that we
have a grasp on the underlying problem, namely, segregation. To that end, a
substantial collection of materials is readily available for those who have
been inclined to develop a deeper understanding of the history of racial
segregation in the United States.270 These sources provide a standard
account of how the nation became racially segregated. For present purposes,
a brief recap in broad strokes is warranted.
After the abrupt end of the Reconstruction Era, the newly procured rights
of African Americans were stripped of their potential vitality in the wake of
antagonistic judicial opinions and ephemeral federal enforcement.271 The
context enabled Southern whites to unleash “an unrestrained form of White
supremacy, violence, segregation, and racial discrimination” on formerly
enslaved Blacks.272 Opportunities to flee the deplorable conditions in the Jim
Crow South came en masse when labor shortages during World War I and
World War II provided employment prospects for African Americans.273
Many Blacks migrated to the Northeast, Midwest, and West, but their
presence in larger numbers only exacerbated anti-Black sentiments in these
267
See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507,
2525 (2015) (cautioning against race-conscious housing policies but greenlighting the employment of
race-neutral efforts to combat racial isolation and foster diversity as a means of solving the problems
facing inner cities).
268
Id.
269
Id.
270
See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR
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Robert J. Kaczorowski, Federal Enforcement of Civil Rights During the First Reconstruction,
23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 155, 183–84 (1995).
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61 (2015).
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MIGRATION 8–9, 14 (2010).
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localities, which provided the scaffold for implementing a range of legal and
extralegal measures designed to promote segregation.274
Initially, the primary vehicle for the enforcement of racial residential
boundaries was white-on-Black violence.275 This hostility soon became
official public policy as zoning ordinances that explicitly mandated the
racial composition of neighborhoods swept the nation.276 However, these
policies were deemed unlawful under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as well
as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.277 Nonetheless,
zoning still became an essential tool for maintaining a racial division in
neighborhoods through the promulgation of limitations on the type of
housing that would be permissible within municipalities or in specific
subsections.278 As a rule, this primarily manifested in efforts to decrease the
prospects of affordable housing so that the majority of disproportionately
impoverished African Americans would be unable to afford to move to the
area. 279 This net operated to catch most, but not all, which necessitated
reliance on racially restrictive covenants as a failsafe.280 These agreements
consisted of contracts or property deeds that precluded the use or occupancy
of designated homes by African Americans.281 Since they were private in
nature, they were deemed not to run afoul of the Constitution.282 Later,
however, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that judicial enforcement of the
covenants would constitute impermissible state action in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.283
Prior to the 1930s, the federal government saw access to housing as a
private matter, but addressing the aftermath of the Great Depression
necessitated an unprecedented public intervention to resuscitate the
274
DAVISON M. DOUGLAS, JIM CROW MOVES NORTH: THE BATTLE OVER NORTHERN SCHOOL
SEGREGATION, 1865–1954 3 (2005); see also, Michael S. Givel, Evolution of a Sundown Town and Racial
Caste System: Norman, Oklahoma from 1889 to 1967, 21 ETHNICITIES 664, 665 (2021) (providing that
from the 1890s to 1960s, approximately 10,000 localities were sundown counties or towns, wherein
Blacks were expelled or banished particularly after dark, and the vast majority were not situated in states
from the Deep South).
275
Id. at 664 (overviewing a host of practices mobilized by sundown regions including violence
and threats as well as the denial of civil and political rights); see also Massey, supra note 18, at 572
(describing how African Americans arriving to new cities throughout the country during the Great Black
Migration were subjected to angry white mobs, burning crosses, bombings, shootings, and arson when
they attempted to enter white neighborhoods).
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economy as households struggled to keep roofs over their heads. One of
the first of these ensuing endeavors was to create the Home Owners Loan
Corporation (HOLC) in 1933, which was tasked with financing and
refinancing mortgages for households in need of assistance.285 To effectuate
this work at a national scale, HOLC needed to develop a systemic standard
for appraising the value of homes, as its lending endeavors inherently
entailed exposure to notable risks of default.286 The ensuing rating system
employed four cascading categories of quality with each represented
threefold by a corresponding number, letter, and color: (1) 1-A-Green
(“best”), (2) 2-B-Blue (“still desirable”), (3) 3-C-Yellow (“definitely
declining”), and (4) 4-D-Red (“hazardous”). 287 Invariably, predominantly
Black neighborhoods and often even communities with small populations of
African Americans were sorted in the worst category and denoted as “red”
or “hazardous.” 288 There is some evidence to suggest that HOLC undertook
its mortgage assistance without undue consideration of the “red”
designation.289 Yet its system was mobilized by private banks and other
financial institutions who began to “red line” communities and foreclose
lending opportunities to residents in these areas.290
Moreover, just one year after HOLC was founded, the Federal Housing
Administration was established in 1934.291 The agency was tasked with
insuring long-term mortgage loans made by private lenders for the
rehabilitation, construction, and sale of housing.292 In this way, their services
induced lenders with available funding to invest in residential mortgages by
insuring them against any losses on these instruments.293 While its policies
and practices generally favored single-family suburban development, the
agency simultaneously implemented red-lining to categorically deny its
insured loans to communities of color, thereby trapping residents in
neighborhoods with high concentrations of poverty and blighted conditions.294
The agency’s discriminatory practices were also replicated by the Veterans
Administration, which was established in 1944 to help some sixteen million
servicemen purchase a home after the end of World War II.295 By 1962, $120

284

KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES
191–93 (1985).
285
Id. at 195–96.
286
Id.at 197.
287
Id. at 202.
288
Id. at 198, 202.
289
Id. at 202.
290
Id. at 203.
291
Id.
292
Id. at 204.
293
Id.
294
Id. at 213.
295
MEIZHU LUI, THE COLOR OF WEALTH: THE STORY BEHIND THE U.S. RACIAL WEALTH DIVIDE
256–57 (2006).

2022]

TRADING SPACES OR CHANGING PLACES

885

billion in new housing had been financed by these federal agencies, and
ninety-eight percent of those funds were directed to white homeowners.296
In conjunction with these home financing efforts, the federal
government undertook to directly provide public housing opportunities for
low-income households.297 Its initial efforts began with the passage of the
National Industrial Recovery Act in 1933, which authorized the Public
Works Administration (PWA) to promote housing, but the few projects that
were still forthcoming under the auspices of the PWA operated to impart
segregated conditions, sometimes even in areas where the conditions had not
previously existed.298 The federal government’s second swing via the United
States Housing Authority (USHA) left a more pronounced imprint on the
fabric of historical and contemporary segregation.299 Established under the
United States Housing Act, also known as the Wagner-Steagall Act, the
USHA was authorized to funnel federal funds to properly founded local
housing agencies through loans and subsidies for construction and
maintenance costs.300 A key dynamic shaping the spatial distribution of these
units was its deference to local authorities.301
First, municipalities had to establish the housing authorities that could
serve as recipients of the federal funds.302 Many predominantly
white-suburban enclaves simply declined to create these entities.303 Second,
even if fund-recipients were formed, local public officials confined the
housing developments to sites adjacent to impoverished communities of
color or placed them on marginalized land next to highways, railroads, or
industrial zones.304 By 1962, there were half a million units that had
collectively been built under various public housing programs, and over two
million people called them home.305 Devoid of resources, lacking amenities,
“[p]oorly maintained, segregated, cheaply constructed, and often physically
dangerous, the projects” quickly became the “‘dumping ground for the
poor.’”306 Ensuing social afflictions took root, including crime and
vandalism, further solidifying the “image of suburbia as a place of refuge
for the problems of race, crime, and poverty.”307
White flight ensued, and the exodus was streamlined thanks to the home
financing policies and practices of the Federal Housing Administration and
296
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the Veterans Administration. Vacancies at public housing sites that were
initially designated for whites were eventually filled with African
Americans.309 However, the continuing loss of a moderate-income base
further exacerbated endemic funding challenges to adequately maintain the
premises.310 Opportunities for Black neighborhood expansion in the private
sector were presented in the wake of the massive outflow of whites who
were departing city centers for the suburbs, but the terms of purchasing or
leasing were often exploitative.311 Further, whenever this growth threatened
the newly established racial boundaries, urban renewal programs were
introduced that permitted local authorities to acquire the properties via
eminent domain.312 The communities were subsequently razed and slated for
redevelopment as middle-class commercial or residential zones.313
Operating in tandem, the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 provided
approximately $25 billion for the construction of a national network of
interstate highways.314 Leveraging public monies, federal, state, and local
officials literally paved roads that physically and economically decimated
Black neighborhoods, while simultaneously facilitating convenient
commuting for white suburbanites who still worked in cities.315
African Americans seeking opportunities to escape poverty-stricken
segregated communities faced nigh insurmountable odds. Assistance was
hard to come by as the National Association of Real Estate Boards issued
ethical guidelines from the 1930s to the 1960s that expressly cautioned its
members to “never be instrumental in introducing to a neighborhood . . .
members of any race or nationality . . . whose presence will clearly be
detrimental to property values in a neighborhood.”316 To ensure that its
directives were not open to interpretation, an industry brochure provided
several examples including “a colored man of means who was giving his
children a college education and thought they were entitled to live among
whites. . . . No matter what the motive or character of the would-be
purchasers, if the deal would institute a form of blight, then certainly the
well-meaning broker must work against its consummation.”317
308
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African American households that managed to garner sufficient
“means” and the necessary courage to gain a foothold in white communities,
were sometimes offered bribes to voluntarily vacate, but even more often,
were met with violence to prompt a hasty, involuntary departure.318 Such
acts were far from isolated as “[c]ross burnings, arson window breakings,
and mobs greeted Black newcomers to white neighborhoods in nearly every
major northern city between the 1920s and 1960s.”319 It would be an
incomplete picture to suggest that the federal, state, and local governments
were not implicated in this systemic violence.320 Indeed, even when not
directly involved as perpetrators, as was not atypical, the impunity afforded
to white private citizens who engaged in unlawful acts was only feasible
with the tacit approval of public authorities that were tasked with
investigating and prosecuting crimes.321
B. Unpacking Colorblindness and the Integration Imperative
What appears to have been most surprising to those who had not
previously considered the roots of segregation was the extent to which not
merely individual private actors, but a host of federal, state, and local
policies operated to create and perpetuate racial discrimination in housing.322
However, this amnesia is not surprising given the colorblindness ideology
that has become the primary lens for engaging with our nation’s troubled
racial history.323 Recall that from this perspective, race is merely a
“biological or cultural category easy to read through marks in the body
(phenotype) or the cultural practices of the group.”324 Further, “racism” is
defined as “the belief that some people are better than others because of their
race.”325 Prior to the advent of colorblindness, the ideology of white
supremacy provided the justification for the subjugation and exploitation of
African Americans.326 The ongoing movement for open housing, and civil
318
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rights advocacy efforts more broadly, gained momentum in the
mid-twentieth century from a variety of deep-seated social, political, and
economic forces that were reshaping the landscape for the continued
salience of the prevailing white supremacy sentiments that had hitherto
provided the foundation for the regime of Jim Crow.327
Early efforts to challenge state-sponsored discrimination were
predicated on an understanding that racism was a moral issue. This
perspective was saliently featured in Gunnar Myrdal’s unprecedented study
of African Americans in the United States titled An American Dilemma.
Funded by the Carnegie Corporation, Myrdal’s report was released in 1944
and concluded that the “American Dilemma” imparted by sordid race
relations was, despite its economic, social, and political dimensions, “a
problem in the heart of the [white] American.”328 In defending this assertion
Myrdal contended that the American ethos was profoundly influenced by
the enlightenment ideals of rationality such that “intellectual order” was
highly desirable in the typical American’s “moral set-up.”329 For Myrdal
then, this dissociative contradiction could be rectified by presenting
Americans with data and information that would depict an accurate “social
reality,” which would then push white Americans to cease discriminatory
practices as they brought their conduct in line with their espoused values.330
Although it operated on the same wavelength as the enlightenment model,
the demand for colorblind policies was initially understood as a radical
challenge to the operation of the nation’s system of racial caste.331 For
example, Thurgood Marshall, who succeeded Charles Hamilton Houston as
Special Counsel for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP) and later founded the Legal Defense and Educational Fund
(LDF), argued that “classifications and distinctions based on race or color
have no moral or legal validity in our society. They are contrary to our
constitution and laws . . . .”332 Unfortunately, colorblindness proved to be a
trojan horse that would permit continued white dominance without reliance
on naked claims of white supremacy.333
Its utility as a conceptual framework to further these ends was set at the
very inception of colorblindness, which is properly traced back to Justice
avoids such facile arguments. Instead, whites rationalize minorities’ contemporary status as the product
of market dynamics, naturally occurring phenomena, and [B]lacks’ imputed cultural limitations.”).
327
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328
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329
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(1948) (No. 369), 1947 WL 44231, at *27) (emphasis added).
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Harlan’s dissent in the infamous matter of Plessy v. Ferguson, wherein the
Court sanctioned the doctrine of “separate, but equal” as a guise for the
systemic oppression of African Americans under Jim Crow.334 Justice
Harlan declared:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this
country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in
education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will
continue to be for all time . . . . But in view of the Constitution,
in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior
dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our
Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens
are equal before the law.335
Harlan’s premonition that the embrace of colorblindness would not
necessitate a disturbance of the superordinate position of whites as a
socio-political reality has borne out.336 The blueprint he proffered has, at
times, been proactively wielded as a sword.337 For example in an attempt to
resist desegregation mandates, North Carolina passed a law in 1969
providing that “[n]o student shall be assigned or compelled to attend any
school on account of race, creed, color or national origin . . . .”338 The state
law was struck down under the Equal Protection Clause by the U.S. Supreme
Court on the grounds that “the statute exploits an apparently neutral form to
control school assignment plans by directing that they be ‘color blind’; that
requirement, against the background of segregation, would render illusory
the promise of Brown v. Board of Education.”339 Unfortunately,
antidiscrimination jurisprudence did not maintain this nuanced engagement
with colorblindness.340
Given the foregoing, it is perhaps not surprising that conservative voices
acquiesced in the transition from white supremacy to colorblindness. After
all, “[i]n our times, conservatives utilize the very rhetoric of tolerance,
color-blindness, and equal opportunity that once characterized progressive
discourse to mark the limits of reform.”341 Indeed, one of the most
334
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disconcerting manifestations thereof in recent years can be found in the
plurality opinion in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1.342 There, Chief Justice Roberts proclaimed that “[t]he way
to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the
basis of race” in concluding that voluntary race-conscious integration plans
to redress de facto segregation in the K-12 schooling context were
unconstitutional.343 Even still, white liberals also found the ideological
transformation appealing during the era of the Civil Rights Movement because
it comported with enlightenment ideals and provided grounds for
distinguishing themselves from white supremacists.344 In short, the former had
employed rationalism and objectivity to transcend racial bigotry in favor of
policies promoting universalism, while the latter maintained backward and
ignorant views that fostered a sense of race as central to their self-identity.345
With respect to antidiscrimination principles, conservatives and liberals
generally distinguished themselves by their stance on issues like affirmation
action and whether liability should be premised on intent or effect as well as
the extent to which rights might be implicated at all when no explicit
race-based public policy is mandating harmful conditions.346 Nonetheless,
despite these important differences, each camp’s “basic comprehension of
racial justice has the same underlying structure—to universalize institutional
practices in order to efface the distortions of irrational factors like race, to
make social life neutral to racial identity.”347 The corresponding formula for
advancing racial progress was fairly simple and operated as follows: “[o]nce
we remove prejudice, reason will take its place; once we remove
discrimination, neutrality will take its place; and once we remove segregation,
integration will take its place.”348 Senator Mondale’s vision for the FHA
followed suit.349 It assumed that the goal of integration would follow from the
ban on discrimination in housing transactions.350
C. Achieving Problem-Solution Alignment by Redefining Race and
Segregation Under Title VIII
To date, there is no universally accepted legal definition of race either
in the antidiscrimination context or in the law more broadly.351 The
342
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (plurality
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prevailing void is not without irony given the initial pains that were
undertaken to establish and fortify evidentiary boundaries for determining a
person’s racial identity under federal and state law in Antebellum
America.352 The ensuing blank slate has primarily been filled sub silento
with the articulations offered by post-racialism and diversity, which
effectively mark an extension of the prior era of colorblindness.353
Post-racialism also views race largely as a byproduct of genetic heritage but
will allow that the current plight of people of color can be traced, at least in
part, to pervasive historical discrimination.354 Nonetheless, without its broader
socio-political ramifications front and center, the current solution still
resounds in adequate representation vis-à-vis diversity.355 The switch enables
a measure of calibrated color consciousness, but stops at the surface and
thereby, permits structural advantages and disadvantages to remain intact.356
This Part endeavors to mobilize insights from critical race theorists who
have hence revisited race-conscious traditions like Black nationalism to
rearticulate a vision of race that rejects a biological anchor and instead
situates its substantive contours as a socio-political construct that “signifies
and symbolizes social conflicts and interests by referring to different types
of human bodies.”357 Building on this contribution, subsequent e-CRT
scholars have cautioned that statistical inquiries into the significance of race
must reflect that it “is only ever a social construct—a dynamic of power
(history, culture, economics, and representation).”358 Thus, “theoretical
framing of [the] analysis and findings, and the choice of empirical foci are
inevitably shaped by political concerns.”359
The current fixation on racial demographics is no accident, but the
practical deficiencies of employing this metric to redress segregation either
through opportunity moves or community development is laid bare by recent
trends in gentrification.360 This Part explores this phenomenon to
demonstrate the necessity of a statistical inquiry that captures the available
resources in a community as well as the identities of its constituents.361 It
352
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concludes by arguing that fair housing jurisprudence has already recognized
the salience of neighborhood effects when awarding “lost housing
opportunity” damages to victims of discrimination.362 Transplanting the
concept can and should be accomplished through the consideration of relevant
equity metrics as captured by recent “opportunity mapping” projects.363
1. Lessons from Empirical Methods and Critical Race Theory
Since the inception of a race-based regime of slavery, it was necessary
to delineate an enforceable line in the law between who would be considered
Black and white.364 Later, the legal toolkit became essential in the context of
facilitating immigration or naturalization decisions as well as in efforts to
erect anti-miscegenation statutes and other segregation mandates.365 Some
of these efforts relied on purportedly “scientific” and “objective”
benchmarks such as ancestry and blood quantum, but turns to appearance,
demeanor, and “common sense” were often cited at different times as
well.366 Today, no such concerted efforts have been undertaken.367
Yet, tellingly, the Eleventh Circuit was recently asked to explicitly weigh
in on the definition of race in the matter of EEOC v. Catastrophe Management
Solutions.368 There, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant-employer
discriminated against her on the basis of race when the firm requested that she
cut her locs pursuant to its grooming policy.369 The federal circuit
affirmed the lower court’s ruling370 and held that Title VII’s historical context
evinced an understanding of race as biologically-grounded, rather than
socially-constructed.371 Thus, the plaintiff’s locs were not an immutable racial
characteristic that was entitled to protection.372 The court declined to alter this
prevailing definition, suggesting it was a better question for the legislative
branch to address.373
Nonetheless, the biological contention is utterly unsustainable.374 In
contrast, critical theorists posit that racial categories are generated in a
POWER AND PRIVILEGE IN A MULTIETHNIC NEIGHBORHOOD 148, 151 (2014) (“[O]ur analysis of these
[multiethnic] spaces must be based on a more sophisticated and nuanced understanding than the
presumption that statistical integration mandates equity across groups.”).
362
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process known as “racial formation” wherein the dominant group typically
distinguishes itself from others based on a set of actual or perceived
characteristics or attributes that are then deemed inferior.375 In turn, these
racial designations enable “racial projects” that seek to reorganize and
redistribute valuable resources for the benefit of the dominant group and to
the detriment of the oppressed group.376 In the United States then, “race” has
consistently served as a tool for maintaining and establishing white privilege
through the era of slavery down to the present, notwithstanding the advent
of civil rights legislation.377
Most assuredly, the racialization of space via housing segregation is one
the most salient exemplars of an ongoing racial project.378 Professor Daria
Roithmayr has argued that racial segregation in housing, as well as its
corresponding implications for wealth disparities and unequal access to
education, stems from whites creating racial cartels during slavery and Jim
Crow to establish monopolies on key resources.379 Similarly, Professor
Martha Mahoney has described segregation as “the product of notions of
[B]lack inferiority and white superiority, manifested geographically through
the exclusion of Blacks from more privileged white neighborhoods and the
concentration of Blacks into subordinated neighborhoods stigmatized by
both race and poverty.”380
In consulting pertinent fair housing materials, precise definitions of
integration and segregation respectively are forthcoming in HUD’s 2015
Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing Regulation (2015 AFFH Regulation)
that interprets the agency’s statutory obligation, and by extension, its
grantees, to actively eliminate discrimination and segregation.381 Here again,
the Trump administration had upended the 2015 AFFH Regulation, and in
its stead, erected a rule titled Preserving Community and Neighborhood
Choice, which mobilized principles of colorblindness and federalism to limit
this duty to taking any rational action that would promote decent housing
free from unlawful discrimination.382 However, the Biden administration
swiftly intervened to restore the definitions and corresponding certifications
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that were established in the 2015 AFFH Regulation, albeit with leeway on
the planning process for compliance thereto.383
The 2015 AFFH Regulation sets forth that segregation “means a
condition within the . . . geographic area of analysis . . . in which there is a
high concentration of persons of a particular race . . . in a particular
geographic area when compared to broader geographic area.” 384 In contrast,
integration entails the absence of such a condition such that there is not “a
high concentration of persons of a particular race . . . when compared to a
broader geographic area.”385 By their own terms, the identification of
segregation as well as the proposed vehicle of redress via integration are
respectively defined solely as a function of racial demographics—the power
dimensions concerning racial privileges and disadvantages as reflected in
associated geopolitical spaces are absent.386
Revealingly, this interpretation is confirmed by a proffered definition
for a distinct category under the 2015 AFFH Regulation known as a “racially
or ethnically concentrated area of poverty,” which refers to a “geographic
area with significant concentrations of poverty and minority populations.”387
The move is a confirmation that race has generally been disconnected from
its function as a system of resource distribution and that the overarching
response in fair housing jurisprudence has been to address the “symbolic”
as opposed to the “material” manifestations of racial discrimination.388 In
order to respond to both harms, particularly as the geopolitical landscape of
racial inequities continues to evolve, the segregative-effect theory must
adopt a lens that understands the perpetuation of racial concentrations of
poverty and unequal access to opportunity to be the grounds for a violation
of the FHA.389
While the effort to direct our attention to impoverished racially or
ethnically concentrated communities is laudable,390 the move to do so
outside the context of an understanding of segregation itself further
383
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compounds a misdiagnosis of the problem and points to erroneous or
incomplete solutions.391 The role of race and its centrality in the racial
project of segregation, as outlined in the overview of its historical roots, is
best captured by Professor Glenn Bracey’s aggregation of critical race
theory tenets to describe a unified vision of the American nation state.392 In
this account, the state cannot be ascribed an identity as an independent actor
with its own set of interests; instead, it is properly conceived of as a “tool
created, maintained, and used by whites to advance their collective racial
interests.”393 Thus, the endemic line-blurring between the role of private
actors and public policy in the creation and maintenance of segregation is a
testament to the racialized instrumentalist control of the state that whites
have wielded.394
Critical race scholarship has proven to provide a salient platform for
exposing the dynamics permitting racial oppression to persist in the
post-civil rights era.395 Even still, many critics have found fault in the
methodologies that have been employed to substantiate its associated
claims.396 In its early years, critical race theory (CRT) scholars typically
buttressed their arguments through narratives or the interrogation of doctrine
to reveal internal inconsistencies or by highlighting the relevance of
socio-political factors to inform the terrain governing the ebbs and flows of
racial progress.397 Outside of a few isolated projects, many participants
declined to engage with social science because prior civil rights advocates
had not garnered much success from the tactic.398 Moreover, adherents of
CRT were aware that social scientific claims, often focusing on individuals
and couched in terms of objectivity and neutrality, could serve as shrouds
that obscured how policies in fact furthered racial projects.399
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However, despite these noted tensions, a new generation known as
e-CRT has taken root and seeks to establish an evolution in race scholarship
through “an empirical intervention into CRT and CRT intervention into
empirical studies.”400 A key principle that has been shaping this work is that
the study of race is inherently a political endeavor because the underlying
category itself is a reification of a social construct that operates as a conduit
for filtering groups in a hierarchy that measures who is fit to access resources
and who is not.401 In accord, empirical studies must employ relational racial
categorization as each group can only be understood as a function of their
respective positionality across an uneven power terrain.402
Given CRT’s initial use of narratives, there has generally been less
concern with engaging its theoretical contributions through the insights of
qualitative methodologies.403 Nonetheless, there has been an increasing call
for combining CRT and quantitative methods and although the endeavors
are still new, a few cautionary tales have already been forthcoming to better
guide these research efforts.404 Notably, Professors Gillborn, Warmington
and Demack have suggested the following five guideposts: (1) maintaining
the centrality of racism in planning and implementing the research project;
(2) resisting temptation to engage with numbers as inherently neutral
because racial ideology can impact the persons involved; (3) understanding
that race only exists to facilitate racial projects; (4) data requires context that
should be provided by consulting the lived experiences of directly impacted
populations; and (5) ensuring, in accord with the principles of CRT, that the
associated studies can serve to resist racism.405
2. Segregation by Another Name? Exposing the Oppression in
Gentrification
There is an increasing consensus that gentrification does, or at least is
very likely to, raise concerns with potential fair housing implications. After
examining various articulations and identifying common denominators,
Professor Erika Wilson has taken “gentrification to mean an influx of capital
into a community that once suffered from a disinvestment of capital, which
results in the movement of people, particularly higher-income people,
into a community.”406 From a demographic perspective, this integrative
transformation has prompted “cheers” from some commentators.407 More
recently though, even those otherwise onboard with the integrationist
400
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program, have noted that gentrification can and has displaced low-income
households of color as rents and property values increase. 408 Since the
precepts of fair housing have always been concerned with the lack of
housing choices available to historically marginalized groups then it should
arguably provide a remedy where “gentrification creates a distinct risk of
residential exclusion and displacement that has a disparate impact on
[protected] populations.”409
Integrationists often propose that heightened contact among different
racial groups will decrease prejudice and promote a pluralist democracy, but
they are also keenly aware that affluent, predominantly-white
neighborhoods are home to valuable resources in terms of educational
institutions and employment prospects among other amenities.410 These
insights sparked interest in creating pathways for “opportunity moves,”
which would enable poor people of color to depart distressed municipalities
in favor of thriving suburban communities.411 Now that affluent whites are
coming back to urban cities, integration theorists have suggested that
gentrification might bring a number of benefits including: quality housing,
poverty de-concentration, reduced crime, better schools due to an inflow of
public and private funding as well as an increased capacity to attract
first-rate instructors, sustainable businesses and public spaces, and access to
social networks that might yield connections to higher-paying jobs.412
Early empirical studies suggested that these purported benefits could
accrue without the risk of displacement.413 However, more recent efforts
have been able to take advantage of new data sets and it is now fair to say
that “there are no serious studies demonstrating that displacement does not
occur at all.”414 This is particularly true if one adopts a broad view of
displacement that does not just entail “direct replacement of poorer by wealthy
groups” either through demolition projects or a decrease in affordable units,
but also “involves forms of social, economic and cultural transition which
alienate established populations.”415 Indeed, given this framing, it is not
surprising that groups that manage to physically remain in place may still face
exclusion from improving or newly established amenities.416 For instance,
Wilson has found that gentrifying cities are enacting or expanding urban
408
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school reforms so as to attract white, middle-class students through the
replacement of public schools with charter schools and the use of
neighborhood boundaries for school assignments as opposed to open
enrollments.417 Even within diverse educational institutions, concerns abound
about the adverse impact on students of color stemming from tracking and
disproportionate disciplinary measures.418
The list of concerns does not end there. Increased democratic interaction
across groups may not occur as newcomers flock to expensive or
socio-culturally distinct outlets for food and entertainment.419 In fact, such
encounters have actually prompted recent transplants to criminalize the
activities of established residents, further fueling the occupation of
communities of color by law enforcement authorities with sometimes fatal
results.420 “Longstanding community practices such as kids playing
basketball on the corner, neighbors sitting on their front stoops, or friends
hanging out in the street are seen as suspicious and worthy of
law-enforcement intervention by the newcomers.”421 A number of killings
have ensued for conduct that was reported as concerning to outsiders, but
understood as entirely nonthreatening by rooted residents.422 The violence
and “un-homing” of gentrification has increasingly led to concerns that it is
more akin to imperialism and colonialism rather than an integrative
precursor to be celebrated.423
Given the foregoing dynamics, social scientists have begun to question
whether the focus on integration policies like mobility programs is a
distraction that seeks to solve the wrong problem.424 While examining
regions that have a disproportionate concentration of racial minorities
provides a window into the contemporary reproduction of inequality, it does
not follow a fortiori that balanced demographics necessitates equitable
conditions on the ground.425 There is ample evidence that the proximity of
different groups in multiracial spaces, whether in urban cities or suburban
neighborhoods, is not in and of itself sufficient to level the playing field.426
As discussed above, notwithstanding the presence of other racial and ethnic
417
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households, communities have and continue to be shaped in ways that suit
the needs and desires of affluent, white residents at the expense of others.427
Thus, in accord with the insights of e-CRT, there has been a call for
debunking the “presumption that statistical integration mandates equity
across groups.”428 Instead, “[s]cholars must take into account measures of
power and the distribution of resources across different groups when
discussing integration.”429
3. Transplanting “Lost Housing Opportunities” to Segregative Effect
In other contexts, fair housing jurisprudence has already been receptive
to the use of expert testimony in centering and substantiating the harms of
segregation through awards for lost housing opportunities when protected
persons are unlawfully denied an opportunity to purchase or rent a home.430
The monetary compensation that is due on this front is a reflection of the
comparative loss of access to amenities or public goods and resources that
may have otherwise been available to the plaintiff if they were not
unlawfully denied access to a housing opportunity in their preferred
neighborhood.431 While the concept has been gaining traction since the
1990s,432 its most notable articulation was expressed in recent years in the
matter of United States v. Hylton.433
There, the court concluded that an African American woman with two
children was denied housing on the basis of her race.434 The housing provider
had expressly rejected her as a potential subtenant when he inquired about
her race and discovered she was Black.435 Unequivocally, he made it clear to
the current household, which included an interracial couple and their children,
that “he did not want too many [B]lack people at the property” and he
summarily concluded that the prospective subtenant would not be able to
afford the rent despite indications to the contrary.436 The plaintiff presented
the expert testimony of Professor Lance Freeman to substantiate the claim for
427
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437

loss of housing opportunity. Per this testimony, the “neighborhood effects
thesis” was offered to contextualize the claim positing that conditions in a
person’s community could impact their employment prospects, educational
attainment, and health.438
Here, the evidence indicated that the plaintiff was forced to reside in a
neighborhood with a substantially higher rate of crime and a far greater
concentration of poverty.439 Further, even though her children went to a
higher quality school outside of the neighborhood district, it was found that
their interaction with comparatively less advantaged peers in the community
was still adversely impacting their personal growth.440 The court ultimately
concluded that $20,000 in damages was appropriate.441 While this figure
strikes as relatively low, particularly given the range of other awards in other
fair housing matters, it nonetheless hints at the recognition of the true impact
of segregation.442 Still, commentators have appropriately suggested that even
as currently configured, loss of housing opportunity damages would benefit
from a deeper engagement with theory and data to more accurately monetize
the enduring repercussions of confinement to a disadvantaged community.443
The neighborhood effects framework employed in Hylton is particularly
attuned to conditions within neighborhoods, which provided the context for
Freeman’s comparative analysis.444 Scholars have further mobilized these
insights to discern a broader model known as the “geography of opportunity,”
which assesses the placement of resources within a designated region.445 Just
as in the context of loss of housing opportunity, “opportunities” are generally
defined as the set of circumstances or conditions that better situate individuals
to achieve or excel.446 Standard measures of opportunity include information
on schools, crime, poverty, healthcare, transportation, employment, and
grocery stores.447 This mode of analysis enables indexing or scoring to identify
regions on a spectrum from “low opportunity” to “high opportunity.”448
437
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Notably, Professor john powell has long been at the forefront of these
endeavors. Beginning with his role as the Executive Director of the Kirwan
Institute for the Study of Race and Ethnicity at the Ohio State University,
powell pioneered a technique known as “opportunity mapping.”449 This
methodology employs Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to visually
portray aggregated data sets that demonstrate the resources, or lack thereof,
in a metropolitan region or state.450 The ensuing map enables us to pinpoint
how variances in neighborhood conditions could either bolster or hinder a
resident’s path to achievement and success.451 powell continues to engage in
this work, in addition to leading many other important initiatives, as the
Director of the Othering & Belonging Institute at the University of
California, Berkeley.452 Since the inception of opportunity mapping, the tool
has been used to inform housing policy design and advocacy; community
organizing, planning, and development; applied research; service delivery;
coalition building; and targeted investments.453 Most notably, for present
purposes, the tool has been wielded by powell to provide expert testimony
in the context of litigation.454
The matter of HUD v. Thompson entailed a class action lawsuit on behalf
of more than 12,500 African American households who resided in Baltimore’s
public housing family units.455 The complaint was initially filed in 1995 by
the American Civil Liberties Union of Maryland and LDF against HUD as
well as the Housing Authority of Baltimore City in addition to the
municipality itself.456 There, a decision to demolish a high-rise public housing
complex and provide replacement housing in segregated communities was
challenged under various provisions of the federal Fair Housing Act, including
the segregative-effect theory.457 It took over seventeen years, but the case
finally settled in 2012 and powell’s opportunity maps of Baltimore proved
essential in shaping the remedial resolution.458 Ultimately, powell took an
integrationist disposition and the settlement reflected these principles by

449
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elevating a mobility program that would enable people of color to move to
high-opportunity areas in predominantly white communities.459
Nonetheless, powell’s proposed guidelines in fashioning an appropriate
remedy stressed that “the success of these processes and policies must be
explicitly evaluated against the goals of desegregation and opportunity
access.”460 Moreover, he believed participation in any integrative housing
program “should be optional, to be effective,” which meant that participants
must have “structured choices” that were “guided by the duty to desegregate
public housing and provide access to opportunity.”461 More recently,
powell’s scholarship has further elevated the importance of centering access
to opportunity as a means to advance racial and economic justice.462
Specifically, he observed that contemporary patterns of demographic change
and gentrification threaten to undermine both the rationality and
sustainability of traditional mobility placed programs, which were
developed at a time when racial segregation was primarily defined by the
urban and suburban divide.463 Given this shift, powell has argued that
opportunity-based mapping can offer a context sensitive approach for
tailored strategies to redress segregation in the twenty-first century.464
A primary purpose of the FHA was to broaden the range of choices that
households of color could exercise by removing race-based impediments.465
Professors Seicshnaydre and McFarlane have critically reexamined this
notion of “housing choice” and concluded that it does not exist for
consumers of color because the market continues to cater to the segregation
preferences exhibited by whites.466 Despite an apparent preference for
integration over enrichment, Seicshnaydre has been able to provide a
framework that succinctly captures how each camp would benefit from a
more robust grounding in opportunity metrics in furthering fair housing
choice.467 Specifically, she states:
Demolition programs aimed at poverty deconcentration without
regional inclusionary housing initiatives fall short of delivering
459
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on the promise of housing choice. Advocacy efforts aimed at
preserving public housing in its segregated form without
acknowledging public housing’s history as a de jure segregated
institution also fall short of demanding full choice and inclusion
for residents . . . . The right to housing choice often is framed as
a right to a particular dwelling unit, but for choice to be
meaningful, consumers must be able to choose opportunity.468
This observation mirrors the Court’s reluctance in Inclusive Communities to
make a conclusion at the onset as to whether a decision to build low-income
housing in a blighted inner-city neighborhood over a suburb, or vice versa,
would be conducive to advantaging or disadvantaging racial minorities.469
As it stands, both integration and enrichment bear the potential to
generate access to resources for households of color.470 Siting housing in
struggling neighborhoods requires equalization of other facilities and services
with safeguards to minimize the risk of displacement, while mobility
programs require assurances that new opportunities are fully and readily
accessible on the ground.471 Centering opportunity maps in segregative-effect
litigation provides a formula for both substantiating and defending a range of
relevant private or public policies.472 Moreover, in recent years, HUD created
a mapping tool to aid agencies and jurisdictions in their fair housing planning
endeavors.473 While the initial audience consisted of entities and grantees who
were legally obligated to affirmatively further fair housing, the underlying
data and the tool itself are publicly available at no cost.474 With a few clicks,
maps can now be produced that provide information on demographics and a
range of opportunity metrics such as poverty rates and employment figures.475
Further still, HUD has issued assurances that the information will be kept up
to date and so far the promise appears to have panned out.476 In accord, future
plaintiffs, defendants, and judges will have the practical means of
implementing this proposal.
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CONCLUSION
To date, it remains unclear as to what exactly the segregative-effect
theory of liability will add to the vindication of fair housing rights. Thus far,
it has effectively served as a proverbial “plus one” in accompanying other
allegations of fair housing violations. However, as the landscape continues
to shift in the aftermath of Inclusive Communities, the time will be ripe for
putting the segregative-effect theory to the test. Efforts to resist the
imposition of heightened burdens as envisioned by Lincoln Property and
Heartland should continue. However, the best possible outcome—including
the full restoration of the 2013 Discriminatory Effects Regulation
accompanied by an interpretation in accord with Judge Davis’ dissent in
Lincoln Property—is unlikely to yield meaningful systemic change. Instead,
this Article suggests that there is a better approach, which not only responds
to the Court’s concerns, but more soundly identifies and targets the harms
of segregation.
Title VIII, perhaps even more so than other civil rights legislation of the
1960s, was captured by a cramped vision of rectifying racial injustices through
the prism of colorblind ideology. It operated under the presumption that race
was largely a matter of phenotype as reflected by one’s biological heritage,
and it viewed racism as an act of individual bigotry predicated on the irrational
consideration of race.477 From this perspective, the ban on race-based
discrimination would transition society to a regime of objectivity and
neutrality, which would translate into integrated and balanced representation.
The viability of a segregative-effect claim thus became entirely centered on
addressing disproportionate racial representation in identified geographic
jurisdictions as discerned via local census data. Early race-consciousness
perspectives that pointed to the historical, pyscho-cultural, economic, and
socio-political dimensions of race were delegitimized as a national coalition
embraced the precepts of colorblindness and universalism.
As time has shown, these conceptions garnered such mass appeal
because they provided a new ideological framework for continuing the racial
project of domination that is at the center of segregation. The structure for
perpetuating white dominance had already been established and recourse to
racial bigotry or state-sanctioned segregation policies was no longer
necessary. Critical race theorists have rightly redirected our attention to the
fact that race only exists as a social category for determining which groups
of persons are fit or unfit for accessing resources that increase one’s life
chances. In accord, the harms imparted by the racialized spaces that have
been created and maintained by historical and contemporary segregation
cannot be addressed by a framework that considers race in a vacuum
disconnected from its inherent power dimensions.
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Considering this dilemma from the lens of e-CRT points to recalibrating
the segregative-effect theory such that the pertinent evidentiary basis for
substantiating a claim requires the co-extensive consultation of racial
demographics alongside a community’s geography of opportunity. The
proposed shift helps establish clearer boundaries to avoid the specter of
constitutional questions while navigating practical problems in an era of
gentrification. Moreover, it is not far-fetched given that fair housing
jurisprudence has already recognized “loss of housing opportunity” damages
when victims of discrimination are unlawfully precluded from accessing
housing in communities that are comparatively advantaged given their
attempted point of departure. Scholars have already demonstrated the
practical viability of applying this formula on a micro, meso, or macro level
through the development of opportunity maps that aggregate racial
demographics alongside pertinent equity metrics. Now, HUD has
accumulated the data and developed a tool that makes such maps readily
available.478 The debate concerning integration or community enrichment
will continue, but at least housing providers and public authorities will have
to justify or defend their actions in accordance with a plan for directly
promoting the life chances of historically marginalized populations.
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